Following the recent setbacks suffered by Russia’s military in Ukraine, optimism has grown among Western analysts that China’s ties with its neighbor and ally may be fraying. Russian president Vlaidimir Putin’s acknowledgement, at last month’s summit of Shanghai Cooperation Organization leaders in Uzbekistan, that China has “questions and concerns” about the conflict was widely read as a sign of the challenges facing the “no-limits” friendship, which the two countries had declared earlier this year. Later, after Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi met with Ukrainian counterpart Dmytro Kuleba — their first direct encounter since Russia invaded Ukraine in February — he called for respect for the “sovereignty and territorial integrity” of all countries, a form of words many interpreted as a quiet criticism of Russia’s aggression.
But are these real signs of cracks in the Beijing-Moscow nexus, or simply indications of the balancing act Beijing is having to perform in public? A more careful examination of recent events should in fact discourage any wishful thinking that Beijing is distancing itself from Moscow. China may still not be providing direct support to Russia in the war: However, the rest of the relationship, which has been developing largely independent of the conflict, may well be becoming ever closer.
A long-term calculus
For Chinese observers, Xi Jinping’s resolve to align with Russia is not subject to ephemeral changes such as battlefield developments in the Ukraine war. This is contrary to Western tactical thinking which sees China’s strategic calculus towards Russia as based on a near-term cost-benefit analysis, one that could easily shift depending on the war’s twists. In fact, in his recent meeting with Putin, Chinese leader Xi Jinping affirmed China’s decision to strengthen its alignment with Russia, regardless of the war’s result — a stance echoed by other senior leaders including Li Zhanshu, chair of the National People’s Congress, and Politburo member Yang Jiechi in recent meetings with their Russian counterparts.
The one scenario that could have more impact on China’s calculus relates to Russian domestic politics, and the potential for Putin to be ousted and replaced.
The core determinant of China’s approach is the geopolitical context provided by its external environment, where by far the most important factor is the U.S. and China’s ongoing strategic competition. As long as the U.S. remains China’s most consequential threat, and as long as Beijing sees the U.S. as pushing the envelope on Taiwan, Russia will have a strategic utility for China: indeed, if Russia remains a geopolitical force hostile to the U.S., it will always be valuable in terms of China’s policy calculus. Were Russia to eventually prevail in Ukraine, China’s position would be boosted by having an even stronger partner. And even if Russia fails, and is weakened instead, it will likely become more of a Chinese vassal state, playing a deferential and supportive role for Beijing in regional and global affairs.
The issue constantly raised by the West of China’s so-called red lines for Russia on the war in Ukraine is therefore null and void, as the conflict’s course is unlikely to affect China’s longer-term plan to advance relations with Moscow. Yes, in the short term, it might influence how China chooses to balance the optics and narratives surrounding their relationship. Both Xi and Wang Yi have certainly emphasized “sovereignty and territorial integrity” in their talking points about the war; but those references have without exception been accompanied by a mention of the “legitimate security concern of all parties”, echoing Russia’s justification for the war. Should Russia ever resort to using tactical nuclear weapons, Beijing will probably be critical. But even then it will see such a grave step as substantiating its talking points on the danger of “pushing a nuclear power into a corner” — an allusion to China’s position on Taiwan. The one scenario that could have more impact on China’s calculus relates to Russian domestic politics, and the potential for Putin to be ousted and replaced. After all, the leadership factor has played a critical role in driving the current rapprochement between China and Russia, given Xi and Putin’s closeness. Even so, Beijing takes comfort in the fact that any new Russian leader is unlikely to be any more pro-Western than Putin, given the ultra-nationalistic and conservative nature of today’s Russian politics, although it recognizes that a new Russian leader may not share the same level of personal chemistry with Xi.
China’s “support” for Russia in the Ukraine war
Xi Jinping hardly mentioned the war in Ukraine during the SCO summit. However a few days earlier, Li Zhanshu was far more vocal. Speaking to leaders of the Russian Duma, Li expressed “understanding and full support to Russia on issues related to its core national interests and other critical issues, such as on Ukraine.” He also acknowledged that China had “provided support by coordinated action (策应) from different angles” to Russia: clearly delighted, the Russian government subsequently leaked a video of his speech.
Looking down the road, China is unlikely to contribute direct military or financial assistance to Russia’s war effort. After all, not opposing Russia’s decision to wage war does not equate to outright Chinese support.
It is highly improbable that two top Chinese leaders have developed entirely opposite assessments of the war in Ukraine. A more plausible explanation is that Xi deliberately avoided the issue of the war during the SCO summit. After all, to discuss Russia’s weaknesses at a regional multilateral forum is neither cordial nor in line with the vision for regional solidarity China is hoping to achieve. Li’s bilateral interactions in Russia were likely a more genuine reflection of China’s approach.
Looking down the road, China is unlikely to contribute direct military or financial assistance to Russia’s war effort. After all, not opposing Russia’s decision to wage war does not equate to outright Chinese support. Given the potential political and economic costs for China of aiding Russian war efforts, it will continue to steer clear of this controversial area.
Economic cooperation with Russia that is not directly related to the war effort is a different story. The U.S. cannot prevent China from pursuing broad economic cooperation with Russia without a UN mandate, which would be impossible to obtain because both China and Russia hold veto power. The threat of secondary sanctions from the U.S. and others may restrain China from trading with Russia in sectors such as high-tech products; but it is unlikely to stop Chinese financing of Russian infrastructure projects, or prevent it from importing Russian energy and agricultural products — precisely the areas in which Li Zhanshu committed to more Chinese cooperation.
Ongoing strategic security cooperation
Multiple events in September illustrate how China and Russia’s strategic and economic cooperation has become closer and will likely grow closer still.
First, Russia held its annual Vostok joint military exercises in the Russian Far East, gathering a substantial list of participants from Azerbaijan to Tajikistan. China’s participation was not new, but this year marked the first time that it has dispatched troops from all three of its armed services; it was also the first time that the exercise covered Japan’s Northern territory, which Russia disputes. Alongside the Sino-Russia joint strategic patrols in the Sea of Japan, East China Sea and West Pacific in late May, the Vostok 2022 military exercise thus represented another in a series of coordinated strategic maneuvers involving Russia and China that have touched on the sensitivities of a U.S. ally or allies.
Second, three days after the SCO summit, Yang Jiechi and Russia’s Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev jointly chaired the 17th round of strategic consultation between China and Russia in Fujian province. It is pretty hard to identify any signs of cracks in bilateral relations from the meeting, which focused on coordination on the global security situation, international affairs and multilateral frameworks. The meeting’s readout emphasized that the “consensus” and “directions” previously developed and confirmed by the two countries’ leaders “continue to deepen bilateral political mutual trust and strategic coordination, and to create a more secure and stable external environment for the respective development of China and Russia”. Such words hardly seem to reflect any shift in the overall direction of the Sino-Russia relations. As if to echo this joint commitment, China and Russia conducted joint sailings through the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone near Alaska around the same time.
Third, during his visit last month to Vladivostok to attend the annual Eastern Economic Forum, Li Zhanshu delivered an address that gave a clear illustration of the next steps in China’s cooperation with Russia, focusing on key areas of mutual economic interest: “China will further strengthen all-round cooperation with Russia on trade, energy, agriculture, infrastructure, science and technology, education, medical healthcare and culture.” He also committed to China’s support for and participation in the development of the Russian Far East. Cooperation in infrastructure inevitably will bring Chinese financing to the deteriorating Russian economy, one way or the other.
China’s bilateral trade with Russia has already increased significantly this year, growing by 27.2 percent to $80 billion according to Chinese data, with the majority of that growth coming from Russian exports. Energy, so vital as a revenue source for Putin’s regime, has been the key factor: From March to July, China bought around 260 million barrels (worth $25.6 billion) of Russian crude, up over 10 percent from approximately 236 million barrels (then worth $16.0 billion) during the same period in 2021.
The long-held mantra of Sino-Russian relations still holds: “China and Russia may not always agree, but they will never oppose each other.”
Beijing is likely hoping the ongoing war will eventually allow it to negotiate further favorable energy trade terms with Russia. The controversial Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 gave China the opportunity to gain greater access to the Russian Arctic via the Yamal LNG project: The Russian government later complained that the Chinese exploited Russia’s weak position with terms for Yamal I that are “neither generous nor friendly”. Now the table has turned in China’s favor again. With Russia’s depleted options for international partners, China stands to gain in similar future energy deals, including potentially on Yamal II.
Conclusion
The long-held mantra of Sino-Russian relations still holds: “China and Russia may not always agree, but they will never oppose each other.” China’s position on the Ukraine war has always sought to balance its strategic alignment with Russia with the optics of adhering to its longstanding foreign policy principles in areas such as sovereignty and territorial integrity. As the Ukraine war enters a new stage, developing from its earlier stalemate, China’s balancing act will undergo growing challenges. However, Beijing is unlikely to abandon its strategic alignment with Russia, a decision that originated from the geopolitical context it operates within, rather than any short-term calculus.
Yun Sun is a Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center.