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Enze Han’s new book The Ripple Effect: China’s Complex Presence in Southeast Asia, looks into the ways in which China’s political and economic influence is spreading through nations from Thailand to Indonesia. In it, he argues that we need to understand that much of this is happening via non-state actors — be it the large numbers of Chinese people traveling as tourists to the region, or through the spread of criminal activity — and that not all of it can be laid at the Chinese government’s door. Enze Han is currently an associate professor at the University of Hong Kong, having previously obtained his doctorate at George Washington University. 

The following is a lightly edited transcript of a recent conversation. 

Q: Can you start by expanding on the main themes of the book?

A: The starting point is my response to some of the conventional accounts of China’s reach in Southeast Asia. There has been a predominant focus on the role of the Chinese state, and often a conflation of anything that happens in Southeast Asia related to China, with the idea that it must be the Chinese state that is behind it. 

In fact, when we look at the current situation in Southeast Asia, and when we talk about China-Southeast Asian relations, oftentimes it’s not easy to figure out intentionality. Lots of things happen on the ground that are unintended consequences of Chinese state actions. And one of my main emphases is to point out that there is a tremendous amount of non-state actors from China in Southeast Asia, and they are influencing perceptions of Chinese influence in the region. 

Could you give some examples of ways in which China’s influence is being felt in the region, beyond the level of state action?

When we think about Chinese relations with Southeast Asia, geographical proximity and demography are very significant. People have not really taken the demography aspect seriously enough. The scale of it is quite unprecedented. When 1.4 billion people start to consume a particular product or a specific set of products, that can lead to wide-ranging chain effects in supplier markets in Southeast Asia. 

So one of the areas I look at is the implications of Chinese consumption, for example, in agriculture, where I examine how China’s domestic meat consumption has led to rising demand on the feed industry; and how that has led to an expansion of maize plantation in Myanmar, leading eventually to deforestation there. That outcome was definitely not intended by Chinese consumers, but ultimately, that’s what has happened on the ground.

You can also see this in Chinese demand for durian and other tropical fruits — a similar kind of chain effect has taken place in Thailand or Malaysia. Because the Chinese market is so huge, it can dominate a specific trend for Southeast Asian suppliers. 

I also looked at the illicit economy, which is quite a large sector. There is actually a long tradition of criminal networks from China being deeply engaged in Southeast Asia. From the early colonial periods, you have the Chinese triads in Singapore and many parts of Southeast Asia, to the Cold War, when there were lots of drug lords, to the contemporary period, when we have the casino economies: these were all run by ethnic Chinese economic actors. Some of them are Chinese citizens and those who are not are broadly related to the Sino-sphere of ethnic and kinship relations. 

Particularly in recent years the scam industry has led to very serious crime rates in parts of Southeast Asia such as Cambodia, Myanmar, and the Philippines, that have led to cases of human trafficking, smuggling and many other bad things. Those things have ultimately led to a very bad name for China, but they were not done by the Chinese state. In fact the criminal networks were banned by the Chinese state, which has effectively pushed them out from their domestic setting into the international arena. 

Can you talk about some of the differences in the way that ethnic Chinese communities in the region have responded to China’s growing power and influence? 

There is a long history of Chinese migration to the region, a factor that is very specific to Southeast Asia, in that it has these human ties and relations with China. If you look at the contemporary Chinese state, it tries to use these diaspora networks, through the United Front, as a political tool to unite and influence overseas Chinese communities for its own purposes, be it political, economic or cultural. 

But the response to the Chinese state’s liaising with the Chinese communities varies. We cannot draw a uniform assumption that because someone is ethnic Chinese, they automatically follow the Chinese state. That is a pitfall even for some governments in Southeast Asia, who tend to view some of the Chinese communities with suspicion.

Why would there be such differences? The historical treatment of ethnic Chinese in different Southeast Asian states has left a lingering legacy, influencing how they now perceive their Chineseness or their ties to China. For example, in Thailand, ethnic Chinese overall are highly assimilated: And because they are so well assimilated, it is no longer a political issue, which means that people can express their Chinese ethnicity without any type of political implications. You have a relatively healthy separation between civic nationalism and ethnic expressions of cultural affinity. 

But in other countries, such as Malaysia, or even more so in Indonesia — where there has been historical separation of the different races, through institutionalized discrimination or state-sanctioned categorization — that, in some ways, has reinforced people’s ethnic identity as being Chinese, something that often continues to be politically sensitive. When the Chinese state reaches out to different Chinese communities in these countries, it can often lead to suspicion and even retaliation from the local states. The causal mechanism is not simply that the Chinese state is doing something: It’s also down to the local states in Southeast Asia, which have different ways of dealing with the Chinese ‘problem’. 

There’s a really interesting example that you go into around the Chinese community in Thailand, and its links to Taiwan. 

This group of people historically showed their allegiance to Taipei, because they were closely affiliated with the Kuomintang [the party which ruled Taiwan following the Chinese civil war, and which is closely associated with Chiang Kai-shek], as well as with the Republic of China government in Taiwan. 

What we have seen in recent years is two driving forces. First, the Beijing government has been investing heavily in educational outreach, providing scholarships, textbooks and investment in new schools in the northern part of Thailand, and into Chinese language schools, to try to draw this group of people to its sphere of influence. 

But we also see the knock-on implications of de-sinification in Taiwan. When the KMT was in power, the Taiwanese government spent a lot of resources to try to maintain linguistic, cultural and educational outreach to this group of people in Northern Thailand. But after the DPP came to power, they cut off quite a lot of this funding because, obviously, if you don’t think of yourself as essentially Chinese any more, then there’s no need to invest any more in educational outreach to the overseas Chinese. So that has somehow pushed some of this group into the fold of Beijing — a reflection of both the rise of power of China, as well as domestic political changes in Taiwan itself. 

Do you think that Beijing has shown enough sensitivity and flexibility in the way that it interacts with diaspora communities?

I do think Beijing shows sensitivity sometimes. They do understand that overreaching can become a problem. On the other hand, they do seem to believe that ethnic Chinese networks in Southeast Asia are an asset. This is Beijing’s preferred way of dealing with many issues. They often cultivate these networks through trusted persons in Southeast Asia who are often ethnic Chinese. That has become the pattern of its approach to many Southeast Asian governments. 

Especially where China has extensive economic relations with a particular country, then it sometimes has to intervene in the end to safeguard its interests.

But there’s nothing really unusual in this. Many governments around the world utilize diaspora communities for all kinds of purposes. In this case, it just so happens that there are lots of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. And in Southeast Asia, many governments are concerned that this network of overseas Chinese communities can provide a means through which Beijing can affect local economic and political relations.

China often seems to pride itself in saying they don’t interfere in the politics of other countries. But amid the fractious situation in Myanmar, the strong perception is that they are supporting the military-led government, which can lead to resentment among many of the population against China. 

This non-interference thing is very much a formality. I don’t think the Chinese government necessarily abides by that. In Myanmar’s case, there are many instances where the Chinese directly interfere in Myanmar’s internal politics. The Chinese government was recently involved in mediating the ceasefire between the rebel groups and the military government in October last year: these kinds of instances definitely indicate that the Chinese state is interfering in Myanmar’s domestic politics. 

On the other hand, particularly on its relationship with Myanmar, the Chinese government is not necessarily only working with one actor. There is evidence showing that China is working with many ethnic rebels in the country. So you could argue that China’s government is actually using a hedging strategy towards multiple actors within Myanmar, to maintain its influence and also to secure its interest in the country.

Myanmar is a very special case. It does not have a coherent central authority, it’s very fragmented. So it’s not enough to deal with just one set of people. That’s been the case for a long time. Second, China has quite a lot of interests in Myanmar, economically, strategically etc. In order to safeguard those interests, it has to work with multiple sets of people. These factors have compelled Beijing to deal with the military as they are, at least, the de facto government. But it has maintained informal relations with a variety of ethnic rebels along its border, and I think it has some kind of channel of communication with the National Unity Government [the main opposition to the military, which has been recognized as the country’s legitimate government by the EU] as well.

Especially where China has extensive economic relations with a particular country, then it sometimes has to intervene in the end to safeguard its interests. But then again, being hypocritical is not really a problem. You can say one thing, and you do another thing. Many, many times, that is the norm in international politics.

China’s relations with different countries in the region do vary — the examples you focus on are Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand. How does Chinese influence on politics and economics differ in those countries? 

One popular topic is authoritarianism, and how much of a role China plays in sustaining authoritarian governments in the region. In Myanmar, you can say yes, this is a very clear case where the Chinese government explicitly supports the military in many international settings, such as the UN. 

Cambodia is not as internationally isolated as Myanmar which means it does not need China to protect it so much internationally. But Chinese investment and aid money to Cambodia is very substantial. Almost half of Cambodia’s aid comes from China. You can argue that China has provided lots of public goods for Cambodian society that otherwise would have had to be provided by the Cambodian state. This has led to a boost to the legitimacy of the government. Despite being one of the poorest countries in Southeast Asia, Cambodia was the second country in Southeast Asia to vaccinate its population against COVID after Singapore. That was based on the donation of Chinese vaccines. No matter what you say about the quality of Chinese vaccines, Cambodia very quickly managed to vaccinate a lot of its population: that efficiency of performance was very much provided by the largesse of the Chinese state. It’s a case, then, where China is indirectly empowering the authoritarian government.

In Thailand, people tend to look at whether the survival of the previous military government had something to do with China’s support. Empirically, this kind of causality is very difficult to prove. Thailand does not need China to protect it internationally; economically, it does not necessarily need new Chinese investment, and in fact, Chinese investment is less than that from Japan. 

In the Thai case, domestic actors within Thailand utilize China to empower themselves. The pro-military forces in the country tend to play up the China model and China’s influence in the country as a positive, and as a way to empower or provide legitimacy for themselves. On the other hand, the pro-democracy people tend to be more negative on Chinese influence. So in this particular case it is more that domestic actors in Thailand are making use of China for their own political contestation. 

Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative has been a big deal in Southeast Asia. One allegation that’s often leveled against it is that it’s a form of debt trap diplomacy aimed at tying countries closer to China. Is that something that you see happening in this region? 

One thing people don’t really usually understand is that both Chinese companies and the Chinese state, when they lend to and invest in a particular country, often want to make money. You have to accept that the Chinese state wants to use its loans to make money, they are not really giving out money for free: There’s no reason why they would do that. I don’t think they deliberately try to entrap the other state. They just simply want to have their loans repaid. That is easy to understand.

In terms of the reception towards the Belt and Road initiative in Southeast Asia, overall, it has been positive. There is quite a lot of data out there about people’s views: they tend to be positive about investments in things like bridges and highways that have been built in their country. 

Obviously, if you are coming from, let’s say, the World Bank, you might say, Oh, this is not financially sustainable, you’re spending too much money. But from an ordinary person’s perspective, the infrastructure is being upgraded. I recently took the High Speed Rail train that was built by China in Laos. It was very popular and utilized by local communities, as well as international tourists. That has substantially changed the landscape of Laos, the understanding of geography, distance and time there, as journey times are so much shorter. 

Left: Chinese and Laos officials hold models at an event marking the debut of the Lane Xang EMU train in the Laos-China Railway (LCR)’s Vientiane station, Laos, October 16, 2021. Right: The LCR in action in Laos. Credit: Laos – China Railway Company Limited via Facebook

We know from various surveys that perceptions of China in places like the U.S. and in Europe have nosedived in the last few years. What trends are you seeing in Southeast Asia in some of these?

The public image of China in Southeast Asia is not as bad as one would think. China is a very familiar ‘other’ to Southeast Asia. This is a state that countries in South Asia have been dealing with for centuries — which means there is a very clear sense that whether you like it or not, there is going to be a China. That is a very much an accepted understanding in quite a lot of countries in Southeast Asia. 

Tourism is a huge factor for Southeast Asia. When you’re in Thailand, if you ask the regular businesses whether they like the Chinese tourists, they probably don’t. But they do like the money. So it’s a very complicated situation. I don’t want to put a judgment unnecessarily on those things. 

What should be the policy response if you’re watching China’s growing influence from, say, Washington D.C.? Do you look at this and think, Southeast Asia is lost to China? 

First of all, if you’re talking about people in Washington, I would say it was never your region to lose anyway. People should understand the role of geography. The U.S. is far away but China’s always there, right next door. You have to take this geographical factor seriously, just as the U.S. will take it for granted that it has its influence in Central America, just because of the geographic proximity.

…many of the things that happen in Southeast Asia, either good or bad, are not necessarily intended by the Chinese state.

So I would suggest to Americans: Don’t overreact. This is a region where China is supposed to have the most influence anyway. So do not overreact by saying, Oh, we’re losing this region to China. There is a natural gravity to the relationship. 

The other thing to say is that many of the things that happen in Southeast Asia, either good or bad, are not necessarily intended by the Chinese state. If U.S. politicians are smart, they should not over-read those things as being done with malign intentions, with the Chinese Communist Party, for example, trying to spread the illicit economy in the region. Don’t over interpret things in Southeast Asia, and then somehow try to find a way to counter what’s happening. Because if these things are not even being done by the Chinese state, what’s the point? What exactly are you countering?

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