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Dawn C. Murphy is an associate professor of National Security Strategy at the U.S. National War College, where her research focuses on China’s behavior as a rising global power and its impact on the existing global political and economic order. In her new book, ​​China’s Rise in the Global South: The Middle East, Africa, and Beijing’s Alternative World Order, Murphy relies on extensive field work both in China and the relevant regions to assess growing influence and the extent to which it is challenging the U.S. and its Western allies. In this lightly edited transcript of a recent conversation, we began by discussing Beijing’s response and approach to the current conflict in the Middle East.

Q: What have you made of China’s response since October 7th, and in particular, the support it has shown for the Palestinian side? 

A: China views the hostilities since October 7th as a flare up in the broader Palestinian-Israeli conflict. All the way back to the Mao era, China provided support to various Palestinian groups: during that time, it was providing material and ideological support. That shifted after the end of the Cold War. Since 1992, China has had robust state-to-state relations with Israel, as well as with the Palestinians, and in 1988 actually recognised Palestine as a state. Since at least 1997, China’s stance regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been consistent. It established a special envoy [to the Middle East] all the way back in 2002, over 20 years ago, to articulate its views regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 

At a high level, its stance on the conflict is that it wants to see peaceful negotiations, an end to violence, a two-state solution, and an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as the capital. It wants to see land-for-peace based on pre-1967 borders, and a return of the Golan Heights to Syria. It wants a cessation of Israeli settlements in occupied territories. And it wants to utilize multilateral mechanisms to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 

Going back over decades China has seen this particular conflict as the core threat to peace and security in the Middle East. And it is very concerned that it could metastasize into a much broader regional conflict. It has historically criticized Israel for what it considers to be its disproportionate response and various violations of international law. Essentially, China has had a Palestinian-leaning approach to this conflict, and that continues to this day. What I would stress is continuity rather than change in China’s approach.

How has the justification behind China’s support for Palestine changed over the years? 

Its modes of cooperation have changed; in the Mao era, China was providing arms to Palestinian groups, and was providing them with training in their struggle for what China saw as national liberation. Since Beijing established relations with Israel, it stopped providing those arms. Now its support for the Palestinians is more rhetorical. But from a conceptual standpoint, although they don’t word it in this way, they still view the Palestinian-Israeli conflict through that old lens of a struggle for national liberation. In many ways that is driving why they don’t provide the critique that Israel would want to see right now. 

For example, the PRC does not refer to Hamas’s attacks on October 7th as terrorism. They condemn the killing of civilians and the violence, but they don’t consider that behavior to be terrorism per se — and they haven’t labeled it in that way for decades due to their national liberation framing of the conflict. 

China’s relations with Israel had seemed to be improving in recent years, and Beijing had seemed to be positioning itself as something of a peace broker in the region. How does the Chinese response to the current conflict play into both these trends?

Since 1992, when they established formal state-to-state relations, China has been building its economic and political cooperation with Israel. It very much views Israel as a key economic partner in the region, as one of the more advanced economies. And it has tried over the years — although it is Palestinian leaning in its overall stance — to be a balanced actor and a good partner of Israel. 

My read on their behavior since October 7 is that they’re attempting to maintain consistency with their past stance [on Palestine]. But they’re also being very careful to try to maintain positive relations with Israel going forward. Before October 7th, even though China tended to be Palestinian leaning, many government officials from Israel and scholars that I interviewed were not particularly threatened by China’s stance. 

In an ideal world, from a Chinese perspective, after the current hostilities cease, its relations with Israel will go back to normal. The biggest issue right now is going to be Israel’s reaction. Obviously, there’s a lot of debate occurring within Israel, there’s concern about the stance China’s taken about Hamas, there’s worries regarding anti-semitic activities in domestic Chinese social media. 

But when you look at the economic relationship, there’s a lot of strengths that will continue to be important for Israel.

All that said, ultimately, if China has to pick sides, I think it would be willing to have their relations with Israel harmed in order to stay on positive terms with the Palestinians, with the Arab states, with Iran, with Turkey and with the rest of the Global South. 

Does China have a role in trying to bring about an end to this conflict?

It’s an interesting question, because over the last few decades, China has attempted to start to contribute to mediation and resolution of disputes. They’ve had a special envoy for the Middle East issue since 2002, which primarily focuses on the Palestinian-Israeli and broader Arab-Israeli conflict. They set up a special envoy for the Syrian civil war in 2016. They brought together the Saudis and the Iranians in 2023 to renormalize relations. And after that, they expressed a renewed interest in facilitating negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. 

So even before October 7th, they had a real interest in resolution of conflict in the region, including the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. They have very positive relations with all of the actors in the region — both the state actors, and also, through various mechanisms, with the Palestinians, with Hezbollah, and with other groups. I do think that there is a place for China in the longer term at the table, to attempt to resolve conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

And potentially, given China’s Palestinian leaning stance, together with the U.S. support for Israel, if both of these great powers could come together, hopefully all of the involved parties could be part of the negotiation and feel as though their interests are being represented.

Meantime, everyone with an interest in the region is concerned about the conflict spreading. We’ve obviously seen that with the Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. Have you been surprised by what seems to be Beijing’s unwillingness to respond to those attacks, given the importance of that area as a route for Chinese shipping and trade?

At this point, I am not surprised, although it’s costly and there are consequences for China as a result of this lack of stability — increased shipping costs, and its broader economic interests being jeopardized. 

…as China’s power grows, in the Middle East and Africa, it’s increasingly competing with the U.S., building spheres of influence, and challenging the rules of the international system…

But given the actors involved, they don’t want to be seen as picking sides, or as interfering in the domestic affairs of Yemen or Iran, which is providing support to the Houthis. This is one case where I think they are prioritizing political over economic considerations — although I would assume that behind closed doors, they are attempting to influence Iran and the Houthis’ behavior. 

Despite China’s growing influence in the Middle East in recent years, the overall picture in the last couple of months has been of China not being particularly prominent in trying to resolve this situation. Is that a fair characterization? 

I think it’s fair. China, in alignment with its past behavior, does not want to unilaterally impose itself on conflict scenarios in the region. It doesn’t want to pick sides. If you look over the last few decades, they have performed this balancing act between powers in the Middle East so that they really do try to have positive relations with every country, and they really calibrate; if they’re going to establish a strategic partnership with Saudi, they also establish one with Iran and with Iraq, for example. 

With the Israel-Hamas war, my guess would be that ultimately, they would very much like to be part of the longer term resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. But they would also estimate that their ability to affect the situation on the ground right now is quite limited. And quite frankly, at this point, China is benefiting in the eyes of much of the Global South from the perception that they are standing up for the Palestinians. They’re not being assertive: but in many ways they’re just being realistic about their ability to impact the situation. The other dynamic is that they don’t want to be seen as helping the U.S., when you’ve got this broader characteristic in the international system right now of competition between the U.S. and China. 

Could you talk about the broader themes of your new book, which is about China’s relations with both the Middle East and Africa. 

The main argument is that as China’s power grows, in the Middle East and Africa, it’s increasingly competing with the U.S., building spheres of influence, and challenging the rules of the international system by constructing an alternative international order to facilitate interaction with these regions. China does not seek to replace the existing international order. But if the order unravels, or if it excludes China, its alternative could serve as the foundation of China’s economic, political and even security relations with the Middle East and Africa, as well as much of the rest of the developing world. 

Another major point is that China’s behavior varies across functional areas. So its economic, political, and foreign aid behavior tends to be competitive [with the U.S. and the West]. That behavior sometimes converges with the existing liberal order, and sometimes diverges. In stark contrast, on the military and security side, the vast majority of China’s behavior is both cooperative with the U.S. and the West, and for the most part converges with the liberal order. 

The last major point of the book is that, as China’s perception of threat from the U.S. increases, it is amplifying its competitive and norm divergent behavior.

What is ‘alternative’ about China’s approach?

It’s very focused on sovereignty, especially around the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which is essentially a very strict interpretation of Westphalian sovereignty [the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 established the principle of national self determination in Europe]. It emphasizes South-South cooperation in various forums in these regions, and it mostly focuses on economics and politics, and there tends to be a very strong role for the state in economic activity. It is development focused. And it emphasizes connectivity between various countries, regions and sub-regions. 

To give you some specific examples: China has set up various cooperation forums: they have the China Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which increasingly includes the Middle East. Other elements of the order would be free trade agreements: they’re pursuing FTAs with the Gulf Cooperation Council, and with Israel, and Palestine. They already have an FTA with Mauritius and have also expressed an interest in negotiating an FTA with the African Continental Free Trade Area, which would give them a preferential trade agreement with the entire continent of Africa. They’ve developed strategic partnerships with every major country in the Middle East, except for Israel, and with all of the anchor countries in Africa. 

It’s not that all of these efforts have dramatically different norms [from the existing liberal order] underlying them. Free trade agreements, for example, are very much in alignment with the liberal order. It’s just that there’s certain elements of the liberal order that aren’t necessarily emphasized, especially when it comes to the liberal political order. For example, you’ve got a strong focus on sovereignty, but you don’t have any promotion of democracy or human rights, or of universal values. 

I don’t think that China constructed any of this to replace the order that currently exists. I see it more as an insurance policy — that they wanted to have really strong mechanisms in place to facilitate their interactions with regions that would be enduring, and that would be based on the norms that are important to China as well as the countries in these regions. 

What is the attraction of Beijing’s approach to countries in these regions?

Many of the states in these regions are post-colonial states that share China’s concern regarding the meddling of foreign powers in their internal systems. If you look at the League of Arab States, or if you look at the African Union, a very strong interpretation of sovereignty is foundational to those organizations. The vast majority of countries in these regions share China’s desire to focus on very strict interpretations of sovereignty. 

Another aspect that is appealing is South-South cooperation. We talked about the Palestinians, but more broadly, during the Cold War, and during the Mao era, China was providing material support to many national liberation movements in the Middle East and in Africa. Back then, it saw itself as a leader of the Third World. Today, China very much characterizes itself as a developing country, and stresses South-South cooperation and the need for countries in the Global South to have more of a say in existing international institutions. That’s appealing to a lot of countries in the Global South. They see that as genuine; they see that China can both be a great power and one of the most powerful states in the system, but that it can also identify as a developing country. That narrative has quite a bit of traction.

Another reason that various elements of China’s order are attractive is that many of them are development focused. This is especially true in sub-Saharan Africa. China has had a long history of providing many different types of foreign aid, whether that’s setting up schools or providing concessional loans, or medical assistance. Many countries in these regions take China’s narrative seriously, that if these countries grow and develop, that actually provides opportunities for the host countries, as well as for China. They do see these as mutually beneficial relationships, and that by not dictating conditionality, and by China giving countries more autonomy about how aid is implemented, they see that as empowering. 

Another important aspect is that China’s approach is less ‘liberal’. There’s many countries in these regions that are skeptical about liberal economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund. They see that many aspects of the liberal order, even those from a value standpoint they support, can be very exploitative and can be used in a coercive manner. So they appreciate that China is not emphasizing those more intrusive aspects. 

Another part of it is that China tends to be very inclusive. The FOCAC includes every country on the African continent except for Eswatini because it recognizes Taiwan. And when African leaders go to Beijing, presidents of even the smallest countries will have an opportunity to meet with Xi Jinping and be treated as a respected partner. China talks about the equality amongst states, and in many ways, implements it through these mechanisms. 

The final piece is about standing up to the U.S.. Many countries in these regions want to exercise their own autonomy. They see participating in these other forums with China as a way to leverage the U.S. for a better relationship. 

To what extent do you see China’s approach on sovereignty as essentially a defensive posture — as in China is saying we won’t interfere in your affairs, as long as you don’t interfere in our affairs?

Part of it is self preservation, and China attempting to protect its own sovereignty. But I do think China perceives itself as a post-colonial state, and so it places a strong emphasis on sovereignty for that reason as well. Sovereignty is the bedrock of the broader Westphalian order, and the core of the international system. China often gets criticized for not aligning with the international order. But it sees its [emphasis on] sovereignty as supporting the order, protecting states from aggression, and from other countries being able to coerce them into different types of behavior. 

Increasingly, China does want countries in the Middle East and Africa to help protect its sovereignty. If you go back to before 2010, China approached various regions of the world in a very siloed way. Then after 2010, you start to see China having a desire to gain support from countries in the Middle East and Africa for its stance on issues in other regions. One issue that’s very important to China is its own sovereignty, and the protection of its territorial integrity and its various territorial claims. So you start to see over time, verbiage inserted into cooperation forums, or into strategic partnerships or other agreements, about countries in the Middle East and Africa supporting China’s stance in the South China Sea, or its behavior in Hong Kong, or also not criticizing China’s behavior in Xinjiang. Obviously, they’ve long been wanting support from countries around the world, for shifting recognition from Taiwan to the PRC. But now you’ve got this more reinvigorated desire to sell China’s narrative about Taiwan to countries in the Middle East and Africa. 

How does China manage to keep on good terms with Arab countries, given the very problematic situation around the way that China treats its own Muslim minorities?

For decades an important part of China’s engagement with the Middle East, and with the Arab world specifically, has been that they wanted to limit criticism of their activities in Xinjiang. There’s a number of factors that make it less likely that Middle Eastern countries are going to criticize China about this. 

Many of these states… have had unpleasant histories with various aspects of U.S. behavior. And so they are more willing to believe China because they’re cynical about the U.S. in various ways.

One is that the Uyghurs are not ethnically Arab, they’re Turkic. So you don’t have as much sympathy based on shared ethnicities. Another factor is that countries in these regions have developed very strong economic and political relations with China. And I am sure they worry that expressing criticism could jeopardize some of those relations. 

China has been quite effective at framing their behavior in Xinjiang as counterterrorism. Clearly, the Chinese leadership has an exaggerated fear regarding this issue, and they have overreacted. But the way in which they portray it to Middle Eastern states, and to Arab states, is that this is countering terrorism, that there’s a domestic threat; and because many of the countries in the Middle East, in particular, face their own challenges with domestic terrorism, I think that stance gains traction. 

Another piece is just the level of human rights violations that are occurring. If you think about the Rohingya in Myanmar, the Saudi Arabia leadership came out and called that a genocide, it was very critical. You haven’t seen that in relation to Xinjiang. Part of the reason behind this is that although there are really extraordinary human rights violations occurring in Xinjiang towards the Uyghurs, there’s just not that same level of violence as in Myanmar, or the same kind of visible mass killing. 

China’s narrative about Xinjiang is gaining more traction for two other reasons. With COVID, there has been less reporting about Xinjiang, less emphasis more broadly in the media. And secondly, something that I hear from many of the people I interview is that the PRC is basically telling them that concerns about Xinjiang are just something that the U.S. is using as part of its competition with China, they’re doing this to make China look bad. Many of these states, especially in the Middle East, have had unpleasant histories with various aspects of U.S. behavior. And so they are more willing to believe China because they’re cynical about the U.S. in various ways.

All of these things have come together to result in a general silence over Xinjiang. But over the last few years, increasingly, you’re seeing statements come out, for example in cooperation forums, having verbiage that indicates support for China’s behavior. Even Palestinian President Abbas, when he visited China last year, came out with very clear statements that the Palestinians did not view what was happening in Xinjiang as violations of human rights. 

You seem in the book to be relatively sanguine about China’s military ambitions, both in the Middle East and Africa. 

The reason why I tend to emphasize that China’s military behavior in these regions is different than in some other regions of the world is that most of it tends to be done in a cooperative and norm-convergent way. What I mean by that is most of China’s military activity is through United Nations peacekeeping operations, or it’s through multilateral anti-piracy efforts, or through conventional arms sales — and those arms sales have stayed relatively low, they aren’t increasing over time. 

China is not establishing defense treaties. It’s not putting boots on the ground in these regions; although periodically there’s speculation about China’s interests, the only actual base they have established is in Djibouti. And even for the base in Djibouti, the drivers were very much centered on China wanting to participate in anti-piracy activities, and also driven by a desire to protect the sea lanes of communication that go near Djibouti, that China very much sees as contributing to global public goods. It was also established because China wanted the ability to evacuate its people from conflict scenarios after needing to evacuate 35,000 of its citizens from Libya in 2011. The Djibouti base is about China’s economic interests in the region, it’s not about wanting to really establish a more robust security presence. 

They don’t want to be seen by countries in the Middle East or Africa as a military power, they don’t want to get entangled in regional conflicts. I think that’s one of the major ways they try to differentiate themselves from the U.S. and other great powers. At this moment, it’s a much more minor footprint compared to their vast economic and political engagement with the Middle East and Sub Saharan Africa.

Can China continue to square the circle whereby, on the one hand, it keeps out of countries’ internal politics, but at the same time, protects its financial and human capital in these regions?

It’s a really delicate balancing act that China is engaged in. They do see that if they become unilaterally involved, or if they start interfering in domestic politics, that that potentially could draw them into domestic or international conflicts in these regions. Up to this point, they’ve been very cautious in the ways in which the state interferes in domestic politics. 

I think they would prefer to protect their citizens and businesses through more private mechanisms right now. The PRC does not want to have a global military presence in the way the U.S. does. But there’s absolutely private security companies that are there protecting Chinese facilities and interests. And so they have ways to protect their citizens and their businesses without directly intervening in other countries’ affairs. 

That said, in other regions of the world, the PRC and the CCP are becoming much more involved in attempting to influence domestic politics and elections. Think about Australia, think about obviously, Taiwan, think about the U.S. even. So it’s not to say that China won’t engage in that type of behavior. But I think it’s much more careful in how it engages in the Middle East and Africa, because it doesn’t want to be perceived as an external power that’s attempting to influence domestic systems.

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