At the end of 2022, Qin Gang took up one of the most prominent positions in global politics, as minister of foreign affairs in China, the world’s second largest economy and Asia’s premier power. At the end of June, he disappeared from public view, with barely any official explanation. 

In the ensuing weeks, wild rumors of an extremely negative nature about Qin flooded into this information vacuum, saturating the Chinese language internet. Official government channels did not even attempt to provide counter-narratives. Finally, in late July, we learned that Wang Yi — Qin’s predecessor who had last year been promoted to the influential Leading Group on Foreign Affairs — had returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to replace his erstwhile successor.

What are we to make of this series of puzzling events? In fact, there are both reassuring and disturbing aspects to this mysterious story.

If that is how the Chinese government treats trusted officials, how can private entrepreneurs, foreign investors, and foreign visitors expect any different?

First, on the reassuring side: whatever happened to Qin, in Wang Yi the top leadership has decided on a seasoned diplomat, who is well known and respected in the West, to serve as his replacement, at least for the months to come. In fact, China has a relatively deep bench of potential successors to Qin, because it essentially has three foreign relations agencies: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Central Liaison Department (CLD) — in charge of relations with foreign political parties — and the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs, the party’s foreign policy hub where several vice ministerial-level diplomats work. 

CLD minister Liu Jianchao, a seasoned diplomat in his own right, could easily have stepped into Qin’s shoes. Another viable candidate was Song Tao, the head of the Taiwan Affairs Office, who has served long stints as vice minister of foreign affairs and vice director of the Foreign Affairs Leading Group. Last but not least, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs already has another leader: party secretary Qi Yu, who is both a seasoned diplomat and close to Xi Jinping through having worked under Xi’s brother.

If Xi had wanted to appoint a loyalist to replace Qin, he could have picked Qi or Song, both of whom have some past history with him. However, he opted for Wang Yi, who served a long stint as China’s ambassador to Japan before his previous ten-year tenure as China’s minister of foreign affairs. Instead of reflexively appointing a loyalist in the aftermath of the turmoil surrounding Qin, the leadership thus chose an official who would ensure continuity in China’s foreign policy. This suggests that after the series of high level meetings between senior U.S., European, and Chinese officials in recent weeks, the leadership would like this higher level of engagement to carry on. It does not suggest that China would like to see a resumption of the 2020-2022 period of dis-engagement. This should be very reassuring for the world. 

Now for the negatives: Qin’s disappearance and replacement also reinforces the perception that the Chinese system is one that lacks transparency and due process. Qin has been, and still is, a state councilor, one of the most senior officials in China, presumably because Xi at one point trusted him to a large degree. Yet he was dismissed without explanation or due process, and no one outside of the Chinese government knows why. If he stands accused of something, it is unclear how he can defend himself from the charges.

If that is how the Chinese government treats trusted officials, how can private entrepreneurs, foreign investors, and foreign visitors expect any different? Such uncertainty should give pause to anyone who wants to invest in, or even visit China.

This complete lack of recourse for anyone, including senior officials, is helping to make China a far less desirable destination for investment for many, including several inside the country.

In a way, this episode, along with the recent crackdowns on due diligence companies, reveals a deep contradiction in current Chinese policies toward those outside of the party. On the one hand, the party would like to assure investors, both domestic and foreign, that China welcomes their entrepreneurship. On the other, national security concerns increasingly encompass large areas which prevent investors from obtaining any information about the sectors in which they wish to invest. Moreover, as the case of Qin Gang shows, no one has any idea what would happen to them, or what legal recourse they might have, if one of the millions of national security bureaucrats in China were to deem their activities as infringing on this area. This complete lack of recourse for anyone, including senior officials, is helping to make China a far less desirable destination for investment for many, including several inside the country.

All countries need to protect their national security, but having clear and limited definitions of what constitutes sensitive information, as well as clear due processes to protect investor rights, greatly improves both their investment and social environments. These conditions, unfortunately, are increasingly absent in China, as the Qin Gang case demonstrates all too well.

---