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Bonny Ling is the executive director of Work Better Innovations, a business consultancy that strives to promote a sustainable and inclusive economy. She is also a research fellow at the international think tank Institute for Human Rights and Business, where her work focuses on the Asia Pacific; and an advisory board member of Human Rights at Sea, an international NGO that raises global awareness of human rights abuses in the maritime sector. With a background in international diplomacy, Ling began her career with various positions within the United Nations, including its missions to Bosnia, Liberia and Cyprus. Her PhD at the Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of Ireland Galway, focused on human trafficking and China. What follows is a lightly edited Q&A.

Q: You wrote about human trafficking in China for your doctorate. How have you seen that problem develop over your career since? 

A: I have worked on human trafficking for many years now. I first got interested in it when I was stationed in Bosnia after the peace agreement [in 1995]. I was there with the peacekeeping mission for the UN as a human rights officer [in 1999]. It was around this time that the protocol against trafficking persons, which comes under the UN convention against transnational organized crime, was in the process of being adopted by the UN. 

It was also at that time that human trafficking as a crime, as a problem for law enforcement, came up quite often. As a young human rights officer, I became interested in the various dimensions of this crime. There’s the law enforcement angle, which is: How do you conduct a raid safely to rescue victims? Who are the victims? Who are the “customers”? As I got deeper into it, there were other questions that intrigued me, like a pool that you go into and it gets deeper and deeper. I was starting to learn more about the issues surrounding rehabilitation, really going into the depths of why this happens. Why is a strict law enforcement approach of detection and prosecution not working to deter this from happening? 

Over the years, these moments have come up and challenged us to think about this problem in different ways. The protocol against trafficking was adopted in 2000 and we are now two decades in. We need to look seriously at forced labor in the supply chain. We’re talking about how something is manufactured, how something is produced and how it gets to consumers. We have moved a long way since those early days. But the heart of the problem is exploitation and recognizing [the complexity of the] definition will continue to be a challenge.

How did you become interested in China?

I am a bilingual speaker, and I can read Chinese. Looking at the English literature and looking at it in Chinese, there’s often a gap in how something is understood or not understood. Sometimes people are talking past each other, with the terms not even understood in the same way. 

When I was in Bosnia, there were Chinese victims coming through: Eastern Europe, the Balkans, was a transit zone. They were on their way to other destinations. In our interviews with them, I noticed that the terms were not aligning. In the two decades since, we have come to know more about human trafficking. We know there’s a complex relationship between victims and their traffickers. It’s not easy to understand because [the traffickers] could be a victim’s kin, or a friend who is involved in the transportation, recruitment and procurement and so forth. So it defies a convenient kind of caricature. 

I remember in Bosnia, we were trying to do some interviews and a Chinese individual just refused to speak. It wasn’t a matter of not having a translator. It was because, as we found out afterwards, they were instructed not to speak to anyone because [from their point of view] we couldn’t be trusted. For those who have worked on these issues on the ground as practitioners, every one of these stages is difficult because we cannot assume that trust is implicit. We cannot trust that their [the victim’s] relationship to a person in uniform is the same as what they would have back home, that they would feel free to speak without fear of reprisals. These were the kind of encounters that really got me thinking deeply about what this phenomenon is and how we tackle it. 

When we talk about human trafficking, how do you define what that means? And is that different from how the UN or maybe how China defines human trafficking? 

When we look at the [UN] protocol against trafficking persons of 2000, it is a very long definition, close to 200 words. And it talks about the different purposes that the trafficking could be for; it talks about exploitation for the purpose of sex, for prostitution, forced labor, slavery, and also organ removal. So it is a very long, complicated definition. For this reason, people often use a shorthand to describe what it is, and that is the first level of mistranslation that can happen. 

In the early days, it was often the case that people say, “human trafficking equals prostitution.” Or “human trafficking equals brothels,” things like that. The problem is when you don’t look at trafficking in its full complexity, and you use shorthand like “human trafficking equals prostitution,” then a lot gets missed. 

In my doctoral work, I took a legal, historical view of how different regimes in Chinese modern history have dealt with the issue of exploitation, like trafficking, over many decades, starting from the early 1900s. I would follow these problems of translation, not only in terms but also concepts, to see where they didn’t completely square up. 

In the contemporary context, one example is if you were to ask a Chinese person on the street, “What is trafficking?” Oftentimes, they would say it’s the abduction of children for the purpose of illegal adoptions. This is a priority for the Chinese police and law enforcement, as there’s a lot of positive publicity when they successfully reunite the parents with the missing child who was abducted and raised by another family. But if we look at the international definition, it says trafficking needs to meet this element [of being] for the purpose of exploitation. Illegal adoptions are a crime, but most often they are not for the purpose of labor exploitation. It’s not the same as the “brick slavery” case that came out in the last decade, where children were found to be laboring under unsafe conditions, making bricks. That has an element of labor exploitation. 

A lot of the trafficking data gathered globally relies upon self-reporting by governments…now, then, the question is, what numbers are captured and what numbers are not captured?

That is just one example where, because the terms do not align perfectly, it has spillover effects. A lot of the trafficking data gathered globally relies upon self-reporting by governments. Now the question is, what numbers are captured and what numbers are not captured? If the definitions are not well understood, if the data counts women and children but it doesn’t count men, that’s a serious hole in the understanding of the profiles of victims of human trafficking. 

Does China abide by the UN definition?

It’s gotten better. If we look at the progression of different national plans that deal with human trafficking, at first they defined it as trafficking in women and children. They were quite mute on men, but the recent plans do use [the terms] trafficking in persons, so that scope has been expanded [in the national plans, but it remains a serious problem on the ground]. 

Shifting now to talking about the Uyghurs and Xinjiang. Is there a way for countries like the U.S. or countries in Europe to effectively impose sanctions on China without hurting people that we’re trying to help by depriving them of their livelihood?

It’s complicated. First, discussions of sanctions and the deprivation of livelihoods, these are not new discussions. At heart, it’s an issue of how businesses should conduct business responsibly, and this of course extends to how they can engage or exit responsibly, should it come to that. It is two sides of the same coin. If we look to earlier examples, for example boycotts on products from apartheid South Africa, this also came up. And if we look to the future, this may come up a lot in the context of investing away from carbon. So, responsible exit is an important business issue. 

It’s hard to generalize. In some situations, companies may want to disengage or completely exit their operations for different reasons. It may be that it becomes unsafe on the ground for their personnel to operate. Or that the business’s contractors are involved in human rights abuses; or the leadership feels it has no influence on the ground and no leverage to change situations for the better. Or it might be a completely economic decision driven by rising costs, if they operate in a country where the rules are not predictable or could rapidly change. 

It’s not so binary as, “Will sanctions equal loss of livelihood?” because it’s nuanced and technical to do it responsibly. Of course, sanctions are a heavy stick. They are also the most visible, but they are not the only option available for governments. For businesses, the question is also deeper than to stay or disengage. A sudden rupture by nature is very disruptive to livelihoods. When you talk about how can someone leave responsibly, there are other layers of questions that come to the fore, like does the company have a human rights policy? Does it have a strong top-level commitment to do proper due diligence on the adverse human rights impacts that would be caused by leaving? And if so, does it have a plan for how to mitigate those adverse risks? 

When people think of Xinjiang, cotton comes to mind, but it’s not just that. If we look at the whole range of the “withhold release” orders imposed by the U.S. government, it’s not just cotton. It’s also things like tomato and garlic and garments and silica. So it is hard to frame it in a simple question. To do it right and well and responsibly, there is that layer of technical engagement that needs to be carefully thought through. 

Before, or maybe instead of, imposing sanctions, what are some other things that companies or countries can do?

We now have the normative standard at the international level called the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights that sets out expectations on the state and on the corporate sector. This has been in place for a decade now. And even before then, there were a lot of efforts to normalize these types of expectations, to begin to change the discourse with regard to whether the corporate sector has a responsibility with regards to human rights. These UN GPs spell out what these responsibilities are, and in the last decade it’s been amazing to see how this instrument is cited and used in different sectors and companies. Governments have also come up with their own national action plans on business and human rights, looking squarely at the issue of implementation. 

There’s even now a very vibrant discussion over a binding international treaty on business and human rights, so things are fast developing and this is very exciting. It means there are different ways of pushing for change, and different things that different stakeholders can do. 

Last year, the Chinese government came out with its fourth national plan on human rights and it referenced the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. It was the first time that it has been raised in its national human rights action plan, so that was exciting. That was a good development. On the other hand, this is like doing research in two different languages in two different contexts. There’s a lot of detail and you need to dig behind what it says. The Chinese human rights action plan did raise this important document, the UN Guiding Principles, but only in the context of foreign investments by Chinese companies abroad. So it sets this divide between foreign investment and the domestic supply chain. Maybe for the next action plan, this gap could be narrowed where the government takes away this emphasis on foreign investments to say we expect this for all of the corporate sector, and all activities abroad and domestic.

There are still plenty of companies that are using forced labor in Xinjiang or have continued to import cotton from there. Is there a time when imposing sanctions would be appropriate? How long should we try smaller, individual changes before we kind of use something bigger or potentially more powerful?

That is a very good question. And one that ties together the different concerns of politics of law and of values. Diplomacy employs a wide toolkit, with sanctions being one of the options. It’s perhaps the most expressive one, that says, “We do not want to have forced labor products in our supply chain.” 

You asked whether sanctions are effective, and when should they be used? For different governments it is a different calculation. Right now the U.S. has been very vocal. If we look at the latest developments in December, they put Xinjiang and North Korea and Myanmar on the sanctions list. It has had an impact. We saw the European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, say last September that the EU should come up with its own forced labor import ban list. Her rationale was that European markets cannot become the dumping ground for forced labor goods. These considerations are being discussed and carefully thought through in different capitals of the world; it’s a very fast-evolving picture. The [threat of] sanctions is having an impact. People who were not talking together are now doing that, trying to understand this technical issue of, “What are the indicators of forced labor? And how do we begin to fix it?” And working through tough questions of “How do we change the way we do business?” 

I think the [threat of] sanctions is also having an impact. People who were not talking together are now doing that, and trying to understand this very technical issue of, well, what are the indicators of forced labor? And how do we begin to fix it?

I also see a vibrant discussion among businesses to think through the concrete implications of sanctions, questions like, “If not cotton from Xinjiang, which accounts for one-fifth of the global supply of cotton, then where can we source that elsewhere and responsibly?” There’s a lot being done at the level that you talked about in your question — small and also big steps, trying to increase awareness among technocrats and bureaucrats, but also aimed at consumers. 

When people ask me about sanctions, what I see is a kind of progression, a search for solutions. This will not just be a problem for our generation. It will be continuous because we’re dealing with a much wider legacy of what is the nature of labor and what is the nature of decent work? What do we mean when we say we want a just economic system?

Many companies are dealing with a hugely important country like China, which supplies so many of their goods. How can they maintain a relationship with China while taking appropriate actions on labor rights abuses? Should they risk sacrificing their relationship with China?

When you frame the question as a sacrifice, it’s like a zero-sum. Either we’re in or we’re out. It is more complicated than that. There are more avenues for communication than that. 

The deeper issue is on values. We need to look at the leverage points to see where we can exert influence. What sectors could be leaders? Could it be companies in renewables? Can we merge these two trends of sustainability and better protection of our human rights? On the international level, there is a very vibrant discussion, debate, and push to interpret human rights. The wider political context is, “How do we have a universal approach? How do we do business in a way that respects human rights and what are the tools available to companies and governments?” It is not easy. 

I see various governments struggling with how they engage with a government where the value discussion is difficult. But talking is better than not. Sanctions or not, it’s better to keep talking so that ideas can be exchanged.

Has it become any more difficult to have these discussions as China’s presence has grown at the UN?

Yes, and no. Before the PRC joined the UN, there were three decades of international isolation. Now, it’s a different picture, where they’re vibrant, and actively represented by their mission in Geneva, New York, Vienna and elsewhere. So these types of encounters have increased. There are important discussions to have, but also very difficult ones, because we’re going to the heart of the vision of human rights, the post-war founding of the international system that is very much based on human rights with these normative standards… I would prefer people talking about human rights than not. The concern is that we’re seeing a deterioration of things like the free press in places like Hong Kong, and that makes it difficult for the exchange of ideas, for these issues of social marginalization, to really come to the fore. 

Turning to Taiwan: I read something that you wrote about Taiwan’s national action plan on business and human rights. Can you describe what that is? What does it aim to do?

Taiwan wrote and released its national action plan for business and human rights on Human Rights Day, December 10, 2020. And it joins a list of others that have also produced similar national action plans on business and human rights. The idea is to implement the UNGPs and to facilitate their adoption by the corporate sector. This is something that comes up a lot when I talk to the Taiwanese corporate sector, that when we talk about environmental, social and governance (ESG), the social component that deals with human rights and labor rights is relatively quiet. Most people talk about sustainability, which is important, but it should be a comprehensive approach. My criticism and call to action for the Taiwanese national action plan is to meaningfully look at how to address fundamental human rights and labor rights. 

Another thing I criticized was that it mixed up corporate philanthropy with the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. The two are not the same. Giving away masks is not the same as corporate responsibility to respect human rights, which means making sure companies have a human rights policy commitment that’s signed off by the top leadership; and that they have a robust human rights due diligence process, meaning they look at the potential for adverse human rights impacts in all of their activities and operations. That is a much tougher ask, but this needs to be done. 

This past year when Taiwan had its first lockdown, many people were not able to work from home, and there was news about migrant workers who were forced to stay in their dormitories. Is Taiwan doing anything to take action based on what happened there?

Over the summer last year, we saw that labor protections extending to migrant workers were weak. Individual companies imposed a higher restrictive level on their freedom of movement than was required. That was a problem. This was emboldened or enabled by the discrimination, the heavy stigma that migrant workers often face. They’re important to the domestic labor force, but not recognized for their contribution to the local economy. So in my writing since last year, I’ve been trying to change this perception that their employment in Taiwan is not an issue of charity. Instead, their employment has allowed Taiwan to buck the global economic trend. 

One of the things I talk about in Taiwan, but it’s also in other places as well, is the issue of recruitment fees, how low-wage laborers often have to pay high recruitment fees for their work in Taiwan. This starts them off on a footing of debt bondage, and increases the risk of labor exploitation. You can imagine that if you owe like $5,000 – that’s the average for a migrant worker in Taiwan – they’re going to think twice about reporting abuse, or changing employers in a bad situation. 

It has actually shone a very harsh light on the structural faults in this current system of migrant recruitment that needs to be urgently changed. The silver lining of that experience is that, now that we saw what happened and the discriminatory treatment, that there will be more urgency and more momentum too.

Have you seen any companies or countries, who rely on Taiwan for chips, put any more pressure on Taiwan after finding out about these labor practices?

The electronics sector in Taiwan is ahead of other sectors when it comes to the adoption of what we call the “zero fees” model of recruitment, meaning employees do not incur recruitment costs of their own employment. The challenge is to see other sectors follow up and to popularize it so that this is not the exception but the norm. One big challenge is the law. Labor brokers collect a monthly service charge from migrant workers, no matter what sector they are in — electronics, manufacturing, domestic care and fisheries. This needs to be changed, so that they do not pay all these deductions from their wage — because this comes under the international legal framework against debt bondage, which is one of the indicators of forced labor.

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