
Within a week of President Joe Biden’s inauguration, his new climate envoy John Kerry established two clear conditions for a renewed relationship with China on climate change. First, the U.S. wanted climate to be treated as a “standalone” issue in the relationship, untethered to disagreements elsewhere. Second, Kerry insisted that China demonstrate its willingness to do more this decade to reduce emissions. In other words, the U.S. wanted to avoid cooperating simply for the sake of it — without any national or planetary dividend.
With the surprise release at COP26 in November of the U.S.-China Joint Glasgow Declaration on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s, a potentially robust pathway for Kerry’s second condition to be satisfied has been set out. And on the first, the U.S. hopes reason will continue to prevail in Beijing, notwithstanding the potential topsy-turvy year ahead for the broader bilateral relationship.
This is good news: As the world’s two largest carbon polluters — accounting for 40 percent of the world’s total greenhouse gas emissions — China and the United States are indispensable to global efforts to combat climate change.
And while the Glasgow Declaration was not a game changer akin to the original 2014 U.S.-China climate deal, which helped cement the Paris Agreement in 2015, it’s as much of a step forward given the geopolitical state of the relationship. In particular, it means the intense levels of dialogue between the two countries on climate can now translate into practical cooperation.
Importantly, after Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s decision not to commit to any headline increases in China’s own 2030 targets to reduce emissions, the Glasgow Declaration demonstrates that Washington still wants to see more from Beijing — especially given President Biden has doubled down on the United States’ own near-term ambitions. While Beijing had made at least four major climate announcements since the eve of Biden’s election — including to reach carbon neutrality by 2060, phase down super-polluting hydrofluorocarbons, reach peak domestic coal consumption by 2025, and halt the construction of coal fired power plants overseas — viewed from Washington this was still insufficient.
Indeed, the big substantive outcome of the declaration was China’s affirmation that it will act in line with the Paris temperature goals and “make best efforts to accelerate” a decrease in coal consumption, as well as its joining of the global tent on methane reductions. On this final point, despite the disappointment that China stopped short of signing the Global Methane Pledge at COP26, the nature and timeline of what it has now committed to do with the United States is arguably more robust.
[W]hile the Glasgow Declaration was not a game changer akin to the original 2014 U.S.-China climate deal, which helped cement the Paris Agreement in 2015, it’s as much of a step forward given the geopolitical state of the relationship.
Procedurally, the effective reincarnation of the U.S.-China Climate Change Working Group established by the Obama administration provides a critical framework for both governments, as well as subnational leaders, scientists, and business leaders, to engage across a number of thematic tracks. This dovetails closely with the outcome of a series of policy dialogues which former Australian prime minister and Asia Society president Kevin Rudd convened throughout 2020 involving Kerry’s Chinese counterpart Xie Zhenhua and a number of senior American climate and foreign policy experts.
China’s willingness to effectively endorse Kerry’s first condition in the Glasgow Declaration is also a significant achievement. Zhao Lijian, spokesperson for China’s ministry of foreign affairs, had dismissed the prospect of such compartmentalization last January, while State Councilor Wang Yi warned in September that climate cooperation cannot simply be an “oasis” surrounded by desert in the relationship.
Continued engagement on climate change throughout 2021 clearly smoothed the way for what prevailed in Glasgow. Kerry had visited China twice and had conducted more than 20 virtual meetings with Xie Zhenhua before they both got to COP26. Those meetings helped enhance trust in the bilateral relationship, allowed both sides to better understand each other’s perspectives and expectations, and strengthened the hands of those in both governments pushing for more ambitious domestic action.
In 2022, the broader international milieu on climate action will be more conducive to allowing U.S.-China cooperation to move forward. COP26 marked a shift from the process of countries setting near-term targets to countries implementing their promises. This will provide more diplomatic space for the U.S. and China to engage on the substance of their climate plans, rather than through the lens of mostly timelines and targets which characterized climate diplomacy in the lead-up to Glasgow.
That doesn’t mean cooperation will be easy, especially during the lead-up to China’s 20th Party Congress, at which Xi will seek an unprecedented third term as leader. Elements of the Chinese system will be tempted to maintain the current approach of being seen to be open to cooperation while still not wanting to isolate climate issues from serious disagreements elsewhere.
On the plus side, Xi himself knows that being a climate leader on the world stage will remain important for his leadership, both at home and abroad — especially after China was isolated with India in the final plenary in Glasgow over language around a coal phase out. This could help strengthen the hand of those eager to see this cooperation take root. So too does the fact that former President Donald Trump’s indifferent approach to climate narrowed the gap in terms of international perception of the two countries.
Xi will also be keenly aware that while his carbon neutrality pledge for 2060 was groundbreaking, its credibility depends on now taking major steps toward achieving it. It is crucial that China move further and faster to reduce emissions. By mid-century, China is projected to overtake the U.S. as the world’s largest historical carbon emitter, eroding any remaining claim that it should be treated any differently. What the world will look like then depends, in no small part, on action from both Beijing and Washington.

Thom Woodroofe is a former climate diplomat and a fellow of the Asia Society Policy Institute, where he manages a project on U.S.-China climate cooperation.