Wang Xiangwei is one of Hong Kong’s most prominent journalists, having worked for more than 20 years at the South China Morning Post, the city’s leading English-language newspaper. Having joined as a business reporter in 1996, Wang rose through various roles before becoming the SCMP’s editor-in-chief from 2012 to 2015. He continues to write a regular column for the paper. In this lightly edited interview with The Wire, Wang discussed Hong Kong’s current situation and U.S.-China relations among other issues.
Q: Let’s start with Hong Kong. There were violent protests there, then a new National Security Law was introduced in 2020. It looks like “One Country, Two Systems” no longer applies. You were for a long time the editor of the city’s English language daily, the South China Morning Post, and you write a column for the paper. How do you see things?
A: As someone who has lived in Hong Kong for more than 20 years, and who proudly calls it my home, it saddens and pains me to see what has transpired in Hong Kong over the past two years. The quagmire that Hong Kong has found itself in is no surprise to me. I came to Hong Kong as a young journalist, and I had the privilege of getting a front row seat while working for the South China Morning Post. I witnessed the excitement and anxiety in the runup to the 1997 handover, the successful transfer of sovereignty, and the first five or six years of a honeymoon period. At the time, the Chinese government and the local authorities in Hong Kong wanted to show the world that this “One country, two systems” formula could work, and perhaps this model could even be applied to Taiwan. The two sides saw things with rose-tinted glasses. And there was this impression that the only thing that had changed in Hong Kong was the flag.
But things changed when the city failed to legislate its own version of the National Security Law, as required by the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini constitution. Since then, there have been missteps and mistrust by both the pro- democracy camp in Hong Kong and the officials in Beijing, which has gradually led them to a point of no return.
Many people in Hong Kong believe that Beijing tried to tighten controls over the city. Officials in Beijing believed they were losing control of the city. This kind of paranoia has driven Hong Kong to where we are today, after the mass protests against anti-national education in 2012, the umbrella movements in 2014 over Beijing’s decision to prescreen candidates for the election of Hong Kong chief executives, followed by the mayhem of the protests and riots in 2019. After the disputes over the extradition bill, Beijing finally lost its patience. And then came the National Security Law, which is much tougher than expected in its scope. And this was imposed just hours before the July 1 anniversary. No matter how you look at it, that was a turning point for Hong Kong, with far reaching implications. And at the time, the city was nearly halfway through the 50-year contract [with the U.K., known as the Sino-British Joint Declaration]. And this will continue to rumble on in the next few years, given the U.S. sanctions and the counter sanctions by Beijing.
Does this mean the end of Hong Kong as we knew it, as a financial center for Asia, but also as a place where you could find a relatively free flow of news and information?
The pessimistic view is that Hong Kong’s role and standing will most likely fade further, and that Hong Kong will just become another Chinese city. I don’t agree.
First of all, it’s not in Beijing’s interest to turn Hong Kong into another Chinese city. While it’s true that Hong Kong’s role and relevance have declined as the Chinese mainland rises and opens up, Hong Kong is still the best window or bridge through which the outside world engages with the Chinese mainland. And given the worsening relations between China and the U.S., some of the best Chinese companies — the tech companies that are listed in New York — have now come to Hong Kong, and are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Also, Hong Kong’s resilience should not be underestimated. It has bounced back from very bad situations, like the riots in the 1960s instigated by the pro-Beijing elements, against the background of the Cultural Revolution in the mainland. And despite concerns over the National Security Law, Hong Kong’s rule of law and its capitalistic way of life and its clean, efficient governance and its high quality professional services matter. It is a free trade port for goods and for people, and its unique location gives it advantages that will continue to attract foreign investment. Businesses will find it very hard to leave.
Do you really believe Hong Kong can maintain a free press, in the aftermath of what’s happened with the National Security Law and Jimmy Lai’s Apple Daily?
Press freedom and free speech in Hong Kong has always been a touchy subject, in the run up to the handover and afterwards. My career with the SCMP can provide some perspective.
I started to work at the SCMP in 1996, and worked my way up to become the editor-in-chief in 2012. And until I stepped aside, at the beginning of 2016, before Alibaba bought the SCMP, there were always suspicions that the paper had changed. Before ‘97, the SCMP was called the mouthpiece of the colonial government. After 1997, the paper was said to have become less critical of Beijing.
But in my opinion, the SCMP has not changed. The perception has changed. We are still the same news platform providing independent, insightful, authoritative news analysis about China and Hong Kong. Our website has been blocked by the Chinese mainland for years. And like other overseas correspondents in China, our China-based reporters have been harassed.
Now, people will look at the National Security Law closely because of the implementation of the law and the potential impact on the freedom of press and speech in Hong Kong. The Chinese government and Hong Kong authorities have been saying that the law is designed for crimes that threaten national security, and that reporting activity can take place, as long as the news reporting is focused on accurate, fact-based journalism. I hope that will be the case. People mention the shutdown of Apple Daily. But Beijing believes Jimmy Lai and Apple Daily went far beyond the scope of journalism. The Hong Kong authorities accused Jimmy Lai of colluding with foreign forces, namely the United States, to undermine the Communist Party and to undermine Hong Kong. I would argue, as many people in Hong Kong have, that the free flow of information and news is vital for Hong Kong, which is a leading financial and business hub. In many ways, China stands to benefit from Hong Kong-based media that are objective, fair, and balanced as Hong Kong is just one of the two special administrative regions operating outside of the Cyber Great Wall. The other one is Macau.
Why do you think Beijing acted so forcefully, in the way it did, and essentially shelved the idea of “One Country, Two Systems”?
The Chinese government has long been worried that Hong Kong could become a base to disrupt and subvert the communist system on the mainland, by foreign forces — namely, the United States. In the first five or six years of the honeymoon period between Beijing and Hong Kong, Chinese leaders were very fond of using this proverb about how the river waters are not to interfere with the well water. What that means is that Beijing was telling Hong Kong: “You live your capitalist life and we will live our socialist life, and neither side should meddle with the other side’s system.” It signaled a hands-off approach on Hong Kong. And both sides were really hoping to make this system work.
But then, because of the close proximity and the greater economic integration and the greater flow of people, this heightened Beijing’s deeply held concerns that Hong Kong would serve as a base for foreign forces to disrupt and subvert the Communist Party system. And during the riots in 2019, Chinese officials were incensed by a small band of people who not only went on the rampage for weeks, sort of wreaking havoc and destruction, but also openly called for the independence of Hong Kong and urged U.S. President Donald Trump to liberate the city. From Beijing’s perspective, Hong Kong had become the first Chinese territory under Beijing’s control, where Washington could compete with Beijing openly for influence. And Beijing was not on the winning side. There were many people in Hong Kong and overseas who argued that the people who called for the independence of Hong Kong, who called for the US to liberate Hong Kong, were very small and narrow-minded. They didn’t represent the thinking of the majority of people in Hong Kong. But that’s not how Beijing saw it. To them, it was a great humiliation that in a territory under the control of China, they were openly calling for the independence of Hong Kong. And it came after Trump launched the trade war in 2018.
There were many people in Hong Kong and overseas who argued that the people who called for the independence of Hong Kong, who called for the US to liberate Hong Kong, were very small and narrow-minded. They didn’t represent the thinking of the majority of people in Hong Kong. But that’s not how Beijing saw it.
Many attribute the changes in Hong Kong to the leadership style of Xi Jinping, and his efforts to consolidate power and create a kind of paramount leader again. Do you see it that way?
During the Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao era, there was always talk about the level of corruption involving these powerful [ruling] families. Some party veterans were concerned that because of this the Party would face serious trouble. So they needed someone tough to do this job, and eventually the job was given to Xi Jinping. And if we look at the past few years, he has been doing a phenomenal job. I mean, the anti-corruption crackdown was unprecedented, hundreds of thousands of officials were arrested or jailed. And that’s one of the things that has won Xi Jinping popular support, and also helped him quickly consolidate power, and [even] made him what he is today.
Is this effort to place so much power in the hands of one leader, and move away from a collective leadership approach, a good thing? Doesn’t this create fewer checks and balances?
China’s political system is such that once at the top, there are fewer checks and balances. That has caused worries at home and abroad. I share those concerns. What the current leaders, including Xi Jinping, have been saying is that they won’t repeat the excesses of the Mao era. As you say, given China’s opaque politics and lack of transparency, they are operating out of a black box. So it is something to worry about. Unlike democracies where the people can choose their government through the ballot box, the Chinese Communist Party must earn the legitimacy of rule by demonstrating it delivers or it risks losing the support and confidence of the people. History has shown time and again the disastrous consequence of rulers losing trust of its peoples.
What about Xi’s relationship with Biden, and the escalating hostilities between the U.S. and China. You mentioned that Beijing sees Washington as interfering in Hong Kong, and perhaps even instigating or backing an independence movement. What’s the state of relations right now?
Before Biden came to power, there was optimism that he would reset bilateral ties with China, after the four years of Trump’s chaotic presidency. That optimism came from Biden’s long foreign policy experience, and the fact that he claimed he was the one who had spent more time with Xi Jinping than any other American leader, suggesting that he understood Xi better.
BIO AT A GLANCE | |
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AGE | 56 |
BIRTHPLACE | Jilin, China |
CURRENT POSITION | Editorial Advisor, South China Morning Post |
PERSONAL LIFE | Married |
But we all know that did not happen. Relations are getting worse. In many ways, Biden’s policies towards China are just as tough as Trump’s, if not tougher. The confrontational nature of the relationship has dominated global headlines. The problems started after Trump launched the trade war against China in 2018 but the underlying reasons had been simmering for years. Washington has long-standing complaints, from intellectual property rights to unfair trade practices to the South China Sea. There are so many issues: Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan, technology and even Chinese companies listing in New York.
One of the prevailing feelings is that because the U.S. is the lone superpower it has never taken kindly to the runner up, whether it’s China becoming the second largest economy or Japan. Japan was once the second largest economy in the world and was fast catching up with the U.S. and spending money to buy trophy properties and investing in the United States. Then what happened is that the U.S. took a series of measures to put Japan in the economic doldrums for decades. Also, the U.S. previously believed that after years of economic freedom that this would lead to some sort of political freedom in China. And that has not happened, particularly under the leadership of Xi Jinping. Beijing has tightened controls at all levels of society. And Xi had the constitution changed. And so Washington no longer sees Beijing through rose-tinted glasses.
Because of Trump’s chaotic presidency and all the stupid mistakes, and the election chaos, the attack on the Capitol, which is a symbol of U.S. democracy, not to mention the messy withdrawal from Afghanistan, all of this has led Beijing to believe that the U.S. is in decline.
Now it sees Beijing as a serious competitor or rival. And for Beijing, there was concern about the mistakes that Trump made and particularly those by [former] Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who tried to drive a wedge between the Communist Party and ordinary people in China, inadvertently helping Xi’s leadership. So they came up with rules to make it very difficult for Communist Party members or their family members to go to the U.S. to study or visit. If they implement that policy right now, we have nearly 90 million Party members. If you count family members, it might be 300 million people. And those people represent the middle class and above. So the Trump administration alienated 300 million people! They forced those people to rally behind the current leadership. Because of Trump’s chaotic presidency and all the stupid mistakes, and the election chaos, the attack on the Capitol, which is a symbol of U.S. democracy, not to mention the messy withdrawal from Afghanistan, all of this has led Beijing to believe that the U.S. is in decline.
There are many signs that the U.S. may be in decline, certainly its international standing has taken a large hit. But China also has a global image problem, according to a recent Pew study. And few see how it can grace the global stage in the aftermath of Covid, Xinjiang, Hong Kong and more. Doesn’t China also need to rethink its approach to integrating with the global economy?
I have been arguing that China can definitely do more on many issues so that it can gain more understanding and respect from the international community. In my column, on numerous occasions I have written that China should refrain from hubris at a time of great global uncertainty. This is a time when the rest of the world is ravaged by Covid. It doesn’t help that earlier this year, senior Chinese officials openly talked about how the East is rising and the West is declining. That’s premature, and unhelpful. Excessive confidence can lead to misguided policies.
Can you talk about how Beijing has approached the controversy over its detention camps in Xinjiang, and allegations of human rights abuses? I believe that you have written in your column that on this question and others, Beijing ought to restrain itself from so-called “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy and be more transparent on Xinjiang.
China can definitely do more to increase transparency in the communication of its policies. On Xinjiang, I’m one of the few Chinese who have been publicly saying this, and I definitely believe that China should be more transparent on the issue of Xinjiang and the so-called vocational training centers. I can see the reason why they did it is disconcerting — so many people locked up against their will. I have doubts about the scale and breadth of allegations of arbitrary detentions or torture, or the forced sterilization in those camps as reported in the overseas media. I cannot rule out that there are abuses, given the fact that so many people were confined to those so-called vocational training centers for months. But the allegations have been consistent, and have been there for four years. The Chinese government has strongly denied the mistreatments, and said those training centers have closed and the Uyghurs have returned to their normal lives. But there are fresh allegations being made. So my point is that if China has nothing to hide on this issue, definitely open up to foreign officials and reporters or to U.N. organizations. The reason they are hesitating is that we have come to a point that the Chinese government, or certain officials in China, see every criticism of China coming from abroad as having an ulterior motive. So right now, they reject any criticism. They should be more disciplined in responding to critical views about China’s rise and its impact on the rest of the world.
Coming back to the point on Xinjiang, they are concerned that if they allow more foreign journalists, the visitors who go to Xinjiang are bound to find someone who will be critical of the policies. That’s not how a major power should behave.
Let’s turn to the expulsion of American journalists from China, and also Washington’s decision to label some Chinese journalists as “foreign agents” and to expel some state-sponsored journalists. What is going on and what can be done to ensure that journalists, whether in the U.S. or China, can report on international affairs?
Yes, as a journalist myself, I find it truly sad to see this sort of situation. And if you recall that the current restrictions, and the fact that many Americans have been expelled from China is because, from a Chinese perspective, this whole thing started when the Trump administration engaged in sort of tit-for-tat expulsions between China and the United States. The point I would make is that such actions are damaging to the free flow of information between China and the U.S., and they are not good for either country. Let’s be honest on this one, the increasingly restrictive media environment in China is not productive for anyone. More needs to be done for journalists so that they can keep doing the important work.
I’m still cautiously optimistic that Biden and Xi Jinping are going to meet, either through a video link or in person, to put a floor under this free fall in the bilateral ties. And then I think to get the American journalists back into China is one of the very first things that they should do. The Asian czar for the Biden administration, Kurt Campbell, made this suggestion several months ago, which I totally agree with. I also talked about this in one of my columns. Given the complex relationship, the best and most effective way to get both countries back on track is to start small. And that includes reversing the tit for tat expulsions of journalists and easing visa restrictions. That could be a very clear way of showing goodwill. But for this to happen, it will have to come from both sides at the same time.
You began your career in journalism in China’s state run media. How does Beijing view journalism and journalists? Is there some insight you can offer?
The Communist Party sees the media as just a propaganda tool. In every story, you have to put on a positive spin. Say there was flooding in Henan, killing people and inflicting damage on property. You’re supposed to put a positive spin on that story, saying the Communist Party formed a task force; they were the first to help people, and then you report the facts.
That atmosphere means it’s difficult for Chinese people to connect with overseas reports. Remember, after Xi Jinping came to power he visited the Chinese media, like Xinhua and People’s Daily and CCTV. Then he made it clear by saying that the Party is the surname of the Chinese state media. That means your main job is propaganda. On the other hand, Chinese leaders realize they need to improve their communications and better explain their decisions to the outside world. It’s sort of ironic that soon after Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012, he repeatedly said the Chinese media should tell China’s story well, to the world. As a result, China spends billions every year on global media campaigns. The most important reason is that China has done such a terrible job telling its stories to the world because of the inherent nature of China’s propaganda machine. This is partly because its primary target audience is Chinese leaders and key officials at various levels of government.
Finally, what can be done to improve relations between the U.S. and China? It’s a question we seem to be asking every day? How do you see the situation?
MISCELLANEA | |
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BOOK REC | A Good Life by Ben Bradlee |
FAVORITE MUSIC | It changes. Right now, I am into rap music, particularly by Lil Nas X, because he is my daughter’s favorite. |
FAVORITE FILM | The Godfather movies |
PERSONAL HERO | All the great journalists including Ben Bradlee. |
Right now, we all focus on the negatives of the bilateral relationship. That means we have not paid much attention to the positives. For instance, trade and investment has long been considered the ballast, the anchor of bilateral ties. That is something the two leaders can build on. I met a good friend who works for a major American company, and she told me that the company was very quiet but very happy. They organize trips to the provinces, and the reception level is always high-level. And major companies, including big oil companies are setting up new plants; JP Morgan was given its first full brokerage license to operate here. In June, the government approved of Fidelity [Investments] to have a license for mutual funds. Those deals are good and may help stabilize the relationship.
Xi and Biden should really put aside their reservations. They both have a very nationalistic audience to answer to at home. But they should meet and resume a dialogue as soon as possible. They should go back to basics by focusing on common interests, such as trade and investments, and reversing the tit-for-tat expulsion of journalists and visa restrictions. I’m optimistic about the China-U.S. relationship. There’s too much at stake.
David Barboza is the co-founder and a staff writer at The Wire. Previously, he was a longtime business reporter and foreign correspondent at The New York Times. @DavidBarboza2