The escalating rivalry between America and China is usually attributed to their clash of interests. It is not difficult to find areas where the interests of these two countries collide. They are at loggerheads, for example, over military support for Taiwan, freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, trade and technology policies, in 5G and semiconductor manufacturing. 

But these conflicts mask a deeper cause of Sino-American rivalry: their quest for status. For people, status speaks to the need for self-esteem. In the modern world, this is often projected onto states. People feel good about themselves when their states do well and become powerful or gain the respect of other states and peoples. China and America both claim special status in the world and have encouraged their citizens to define their identities, in part, in relation to it. People routinely make compromises when their interests clash, but usually dig in their heels when conflict arises over their identities.

The struggle for status is also dangerous because it can be zero sum if people or states are trying to achieve it in the same way. The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes compares it to glory and observes that “if all men have it, no man hath it.” Academic research has shown that the struggle for status has been the principal cause of international conflict and war. It also lies at the core of Sino-American rivalry.

The United States has long claimed for itself a hegemonic status in East Asia. Since the end of World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold War, it has pursued an ambitious strategy of liberal hegemony. The Trump administration, despite its many departures from tradition, doubled down on the goal of hegemony by identifying regional primacy as the goal of its Indo-Pacific strategy.

Numerous U.S. observers assert that China’s goal in Asia is dominance by a conscious design to undermine American influence. A more defensible view is that Beijing wants equal status with Washington, as reflected in the statement that “the Pacific Ocean is spacious enough to accommodate both China and America.” One may interpret this to imply that the Pacific, which has been dominated by the U.S. since the Second World War, must accommodate rising Chinese influence on a par with that of the U.S. 

The first, and perhaps the most difficult, step is for both countries to dispel the notion that only hegemony can satisfy their status needs.

China has constructed America as a threat to its self-esteem. When Chinese elites criticize American “hegemony” and accuse it of seeking to contain China’s rise, they reveal the centrality of the search for status in China’s international goals. They believe that it is only natural for China — a country with ancient history, proud traditions and proven pre-eminence — to restore its rightful standing in Asia. American efforts to maintain its alleged regional hegemony are seen as attempts to thwart the goal of national rejuvenation — an affront to Chinese self-esteem that justifies competition for honor and standing.

If status is wedded to hegemony or dominance, a drive for it by either America or China, let alone by both, might well end up in conflict. Such an outcome can, however, be averted by creating multiple pathways to status. Washington and Beijing need not seek to achieve status in the same way or in the same areas.

The first, and perhaps the most difficult, step is for both countries to dispel the notion that only hegemony can satisfy their status needs. Status must be disengaged from hegemony, dominance, superiority, or any other such concept. There can be multiple pathways to status, with hegemony being only one and a counterproductive one at that. America and China should reject hegemony as the goal of their Asia policy.

Once this is done, they can take advantage of different pathways to status by devoting foreign policy efforts to skills and fields at which they excel. The U.S. could emphasize rights-based initiatives for the promotion of freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and democracy in places where conditions allow. The best way to promote these American values is, as President Biden has emphasized, by the power of the American example, not, as often in the past, by militaristic interventionism. 

In foreign policy the U.S. could highlight traditional security approaches, alliance solidarity, and market economy, and the positive role these can play in fostering development and helping to maintain international strategic and economic stability. 

China could follow the same spirit by stressing community-based actions for the advancement of economic growth, social harmony, and international peace. Like the U.S., it should adopt the method of exemplification by setting itself up as a worthy example for others to emulate, rather than exporting or imposing its model on others. 

In foreign policy China’s advantages lie in non-traditional security approaches, development assistance, and large-scale infrastructure building as manifested in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These happen to be areas neglected by the U.S.

The American emphasis on rights and the Chinese emphasis on community are often framed as a clash of values and politicized as an ideological rivalry. They derive from different intellectual traditions — liberalism in the U.S. case and Confucianism in the Chinese case. It is, however, possible to conceive of them as different pathways to status. Doing so would transfer the focus from ideology to practice, which would have the salutary effect of transforming the zero-sum nature of Sino-American status competition to one of positive sum.

Both countries have much to improve in their respective fields. America’s traditional security policies are too militarized, and the recipe of market economy often results in financial crises without generating sustained economic growth. China’s leadership in non-traditional security issues is still incipient and hesitant, and the BRI has been beset by a host of political, financial and environmental problems. 

The strategy of creating different pathways to status would also require both countries to avoid making invidious comparisons when stressing their comparative advantages and substantive accomplishments. They need to adhere to the spirit of pluralism, namely, the American and Chinese ways of attaining status may be no worse than each other, each being good through being a good instance of a different pathway. There is no need to claim superiority for the American emphasis on rights or the Chinese emphasis on community. Indeed, the world will benefit if both ways succeed in a complementary fashion.

Such a strategy would sidestep the contentious and ultimately irresolvable question of American or Chinese hegemony, and enable both countries to strive for their own success while making contributions to the international community. Once neither country is engaged in the quest for status through hegemony, they will more easily resolve their substantive disputes in other areas.  

This essay is drawn from Taming Sino-American Rivalry (Oxford University Press, 2020), co-written by the authors.

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