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Eric X. Li is a Shanghai-based venture capitalist and political commentator. He earned a B.A. from Berkeley, an MBA from Stanford’s Graduate School of Business and a Ph.D. in political science from Fudan University. In 2000, he formed Chengwei Capital, a venture capital firm that has invested in some of China’s hottest startups, including HelloBike and Youku¹ which was later acquired by Alibaba. Today, he is even better known for his provocative op-ed articles and essays for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The New York Times and the Financial Times about America’s failings and “Why China’s Political Model is Superior.” His TED Talk, “A Tale of Two Political Systems,” has been viewed 3 million times on Youtube. See Gideon Rachman’s Lunch with the FT profile here.

Q: Are we in a new Cold War, or a Cold War II as the scholar Niall Ferguson calls it?

A: I hope not, for America’s sake, because it’s completely unnecessary. And if there was a new Cold War, I don’t think the US would win it. Today, it’s America — not China — that is more like the Soviet Union in the last stage of the Cold War. China is the opposite of what the Soviet Union was; whereas America is looking like the Soviet Union. I realize it’s an imperfect analogy, but I’m just trying to make a point here. That it is not a repeat of the second half of the 20th century. China is not the Soviet Union, and America today is not the America of the 20th century. Quite the contrary. I don’t think China is interested in a new Cold War. And I don’t think America should. And yet there are many elements in American society — mostly the elites and politicians — who seem to be cheering one on. That’s unfortunate. It’s not intelligent. They ought to assess America’s conditions more closely. In China, there’s this old saying, “You cannot tell the true conditions of the mountain, because you’re inside of it.” American elites would be well advised to step out a little bit and look at their own country’s conditions more rationally because America faces enormous challenges inside. If they don’t effectively address them soon, the US is the country that might face the fate George Kennan predicted for the USSR — collapsing under the weight of its own contradictions.  

But doesn’t it have the makings of a new Cold War, with the heated rhetoric, geopolitical tensions and a trade war…? 

I really don’t think so. It takes two to tango and it takes at least two to have a war. Look, there may be such a mentality in the US but not here [in China]. During the Cold War, the Eastern bloc and the Western bloc were completely separated. There was nothing. Very little trade. No cultural exchange. No educational exchange. The conversation that you and I are having right now was unthinkable in 1975. But today, China is fully connected with the rest of the world. China is the largest trading nation in the world, and in history. About 124 countries count China as their largest trading partner; about 76 countries count the US as their largest trading partner. So this is completely different from the Cold War era. There are myriad connections between China and the rest of the world across geographical, cultural and ideological boundaries, on a daily basis. So making a Cold War analogy is difficult and misleading. 

Now, there is [heated] rhetoric. And there are actions taken that you could compare to the Cold War. But I don’t think it’s the same nature. And I certainly don’t think they would generate the same results. And the US is facing unprecedented challenges. You’ve got an extremely divided nation along the lines of identity politics; income inequality is getting worse. It’s not about policy. It’s us versus them. You’ve got record turnout [in the 2020 election] and that was probably a bad sign. It’s not a good sign. You’d think record turnout is a sign of optimism. This record turnout is a sign of trouble, because the choice was so stark and the divisions so intense. The data shows that Americans think that future generations are going to be worse off than they are. There are racial divisions too. It’s a country that faces tremendous internal challenges. This doesn’t look and smell like a country that should go into a “Cold War,” much less win one!

Can you give an assessment of the Trump administration and its China policy? We’ve obviously seen deteriorating relations between the two countries, with diplomatic battles, a trade war, sanctions and more… 

Look there are three problems I see here. The whole thing really heated up during the last two years. The first is what I call the “irrational rivalry” problem. Everybody understands China and the US are competitors, even strategic rivals in many areas. And competition is healthy, even rivalry, right? The two countries might be rivals. And they could even be adversaries, in certain respects. But irrational rivalry is where you hurt yourself. You’re willing to hurt yourself if you can hurt your enemy. That’s irrational in this situation. The trade war, for instance, damaged the American economy, maybe even more than the Chinese economy. And this global competition for influence. The US is being very aggressive around the world, forcing countries to take sides. In some cases, you can argue it has to do with security, but in other cases it’s very difficult to ascertain what the security issues are. And I think that hurts America’s standing around the world, even among its allies. So it’s an irrational rivalry, and it’s unfortunate that if you take policies that hurt your own people to hurt a perceived adversary. It’s unnecessary. It’s not like the Cold War. I don’t think China and the US pose an existential threat to one another. That is one fundamental difference between now and the Cold War. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union wanted to take over the world, and the US maybe wanted to take over the world, or at least defend itself against being taken over. And by taken over I mean economically, militarily and ideologically. You try to spread your political ideas, and your values, around the world in such a fight, often by force. And today, I just don’t think that’s the case, not from the Chinese perspective. On the other hand, the US has tried to do that, in Iraq and other places with dismal results. I think the US better re-evaluate this messianic approach lest it really becomes ever more like the USSR. America is reflecting on this and may be changing — and this is encouraging. I might even say this has been a significant contribution by the Trump administration. He did not start any wars.

What happened to US-China relations? Why did things change?

This comes to the second problem I see. In the US, there’s a dominance mindset, the prism through which they see the world. It’s either you or me. It’s a hegemonic mindset. Somehow, they think China is about to overtake the US, and that’s bad. They cannot imagine a world where another country may be bigger than them in some respects, in some critical respects. In GDP for instance. That’s unnecessary because China has no desire to dominate the world. It’s not exporting its ideology anywhere in the world. It’s not exporting its governing model. It’s not invading anyone. It’s growing, growing big. So it has its interests. It’s going to advance and defend its interests around the world. But every country does that. China hasn’t fought a war for more than 40 years. It has not fired a shot in almost half a century. Think about that. And the last shot fired was a small one, in a brief conflict with Vietnam. Since Korea in the early 1950s China hasn’t really had any major military conflict with anyone. The US is fighting wars every year, sometimes endless wars.

It sounds like you’re suggesting the problem is really jealousy, or the inability of the US to deal with a challenge to its status in the world. Is that what you’re saying?

Yes. This is a hegemonic mindset, that somehow the world needs a dominant power; that one power is going to dominate the world. That idea is passé. It’s irrational. It’s not true. China’s not going to dominate the world. And secondly, it’s morally indefensible to somehow say that China cannot surpass the US in economic size. China has 1.4 billion people! Are you saying that somehow China’s per capita income has to forever remain below America’s? That Chinese people must in principle be poorer than Americans? That’s just morally indefensible. You cannot make the case that somehow China, the Chinese people, don’t have the right to work hard, to govern themselves in ways they want to govern themselves, and reach the living standards of developed countries. How do you defend that case? How do you defend that morally? China’s economy, just by the sheer size of the numbers, will surpass America’s size.

Li gave a TED Talk called “A Tale of Two Political Systems,” arguing against the idea that a democratic system is the solution for every nation.

It seems the Trump administration — and a growing number of other officials in the US and abroad — see a more aggressive China: with a military buildup in the South China Sea, cyber attacks, mass detention camps in Xinjiang, a surveillance state, and the developments in Hong Kong. There’s this suggestion that China has shifted course. What do you say to them?

Again, China’s growing a lot. It’s gotten bigger. It’s got a lot of interests around the world, it will advance and defend its interest, like any other country. Look, I only have a single one liner to counter that: China hasn’t invaded anybody. No one. Can America say that? I mean, if America could stop invading other countries for five years, then we can talk. I hope I won’t offend people by saying this, and it’s an objective analysis, not a put down: America has been failing so fast. And it’s unfortunate and alarming and it’s not something that I or most of Chinese people want to see. This is the danger for America, not imagined aggression by China.

How so? 

Politically and socially. How about just socially? How about people’s lives? And their aspirations and how they see each other — other Americans? Social cohesion, the social contract, are all falling apart.

Let’s talk about Xinjiang. There are reports of mass detention facilities in the northwest of the country, filled with ethnic Uighur minorities, a bit like prison camps. Some Western nations have condemned China for what they say are human rights abuses. The US has even gone so far as to sanction some Chinese firms for helping the Chinese government carry out these policies. China, on the other hand, refers to them “re-education camps” or training facilities. What can you say about what is happening there?

Xinjiang is a sensitive region of China. We’ve had stress and strife there. We had a lot of terrorist attacks there with significant casualties. But since the implementation of these policies, those attacks have gone to near zero. Obviously, these policies are controversial. But Islamic extremism has been a difficult situation to deal with all over the world. Look at what’s happened recently in France. And my own view is that China has done, on balance, better than most countries [in dealing with this problem]. We’ve just gone through the worst pandemic in 100 years and what we’ve seen is that in the US, minorities have generally had higher infection rates and death rates. But in China, ethnic Uighur minorities in Xinjiang have been well protected. Very few ethnic Uighur minorities have been infected, and I don’t think there have been any deaths.

So you acknowledge that there are these mass detention camps in Xinjiang?

I’ve never been to one. But I understand people are congregated in these areas. I’ve heard they have classes and undergo patriotic education. They are being persuaded to part ways with extremist activities, and not to be brainwashed by extremist ideologies. The irony is that only Western countries have gotten together to condemn China’s policies in Xinjiang. None of them are Muslim countries. Collectively, Muslim countries have expressed support. Couldn’t the West convince even one Muslim country to join them? One? What does that tell you?

One of the other hot spots is Hong Kong, where Beijing has moved aggressively and introduced a new National Security Law. Beijing has been criticized for a crackdown on pro-democracy activists and stifling free speech. Some say that Beijing has, in effect, abandoned the notion of “one country, two systems.” What do you say?

I really hope, for the sake of the American people, that they save some lives in America first, before they worry about Hong Kong — some lives… How about saving some lives – in America? American lives, please! Very few people have died in Hong Kong, neither from the pandemic nor the protests. Very few. Maybe one. You’re up to a quarter million [240,000] people dead because of a failure in governance [in the Covid-19 pandemic]. Hong Kong? Give me a break. Please! I mean, how could an American leader be responsibly telling its people they’re going to worry about Hong Kong. The American people should really be mad at this. It’s maddening that elites like you are asking about Hong Kong when your fellow countrymen are dying around you, because of a miserable failure of governance. It’s unconscionable.

What’s your description of what happened in Hong Kong? 

We had some dissatisfaction in Hong Kong. And there are a lot of divisions. There are problems, like any other place in the world. Look, there are protests in Paris, in France, that were put down violently, much more violently than in Hong Kong. There are protests today everywhere in England against wearing masks.

Is Beijing moving away from its commitments to “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong? 

I haven’t seen any evidence of that. The National Security Law was an existing requirement in the Basic Law from day one and was supposed to be implemented. I don’t see anything that’s outside the framework that’s been set 20 years ago. The National Security Law was already part of the legal package for the 1997 transfer, returning Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty.

They just released it now?

There was a process. It was supposed to have been done earlier. But because of various disagreements, it was delayed. And now it got done. I’m sure it was triggered in part by recent civil disturbances and the struggles but to say that somehow that’s a sign that China is going to tear up the 50 year agreement, that’s just incorrect. The National Security Law was very much part of that agreement and the law to begin with.

The US and Britain condemned the law and the European Union called it a “comprehensive assault on Hong Kong’s autonomy, rule of law, and fundamental freedoms.” What do you say?

They can say anything they want, but they seem to not have read the documents that they are referring to, that they all supported 20 years ago. It was all there. The National Security Law was supposed to be implemented. It was part of the entire transition arrangement and part of the foundation of Hong Kong’s governance.

Can we shift to Taiwan? There are growing tensions between the US and China over Taiwan, and hints of a military buildup and strong statements from China about Taiwan. Some worry that this is a dangerous period for the US and China because there could be an accident or a trigger related to Taiwan. What do you say?

Well, I don’t think the answer is in China’s hands. What’s dangerous is that if the US and Taiwan begin to use each other for political and geopolitical reasons. That’s playing with fire. That’s unnecessarily dangerous and unnecessarily risky, if it gets out of hand. Taiwan is part of China. The current situation has been peaceful, luckily, for a long time, but you cannot use that to say that somehow Taiwan can be separated from China. It’s just not an option for the Chinese people.

There have been growing tensions between the US and China in the disputed waters of the South China Sea, with US warships navigating through the area and Chinese ships warning that China’s sovereignty has been violated. Is China trying to push the US out of the region?

Look, China is the largest trading nation in the world. So it’s in China’s interest to keep all the sea lanes open and secure so that everybody can trade, and ships can pass through in the open seas, lawfully. I haven’t seen any case where China has interfered with navigation or trading. These are hypothetical cases that people cook up and say it’s a threat. I just don’t see why China somehow wants to block trade and navigation. There are disputes. There may be disputes about whose territory it is. That’s a very technical issue. And I hope they can get resolved peacefully. But it’s better for territorial disputes to be resolved peacefully, among those involved in the dispute, those who are claimants. The US is not a claimant in those disputes.

What has happened to the idea of engagement? This is something you were very much involved in — you studied in the US, and you returned to China to invest American and Chinese money. Is this period of engagement over? 

We’re in a difficult transitional period. But I want to differ from those who say that engagement has failed. Engagement succeeded. Engagement has benefited both countries tremendously. When President Nixon reached out to China and opened the relationship, it fundamentally changed China’s international posture and policies to America’s favor. You might even argue that it played a crucial role in the US victory in the Cold War. After the Cold War’s end, China has grown by integrating itself into the global system, and the US played a leadership role in that. China’s economy has grown, and 800 million people have been lifted out of poverty and things continue to advance. In America, income has also grown because of globalization. I don’t think anyone can dispute that both countries have benefited tremendously from economic globalization, and from engagement between the two countries. From 2001, when China joined the W.T.O. to now, China’s economy grew tremendously. GDP went up, 10X, and median income went up 8 or 9X. And in the US, GDP also grew tremendously. It’s doubled, from a much higher baseline. So the absolute economic gains by both countries were similar in size. In some ways you might even say the US gained more because its companies had much higher profit margins. A well-known story is that with the sale of each iPhone, less than $10 [of the cost of producing it] stayed in China. China’s growth for the past few decades has been low margin growth, although it reduced poverty and created employment. So both countries got similar economic benefits. But the big difference is, US median income during the same period stagnated, or even declined. And that, you cannot blame China. That’s the problem with distribution within the US. China does not play a role in how America divides its pie. It doesn’t get involved in how America spreads these benefits among its own people or whether America has invested those gains in public education to make their people more competitive.

One crucial factor in engagement was this idea that China would be integrated into the global economy and a rules based order; that it would enter the W.T.O., embrace globalization, and become what some referred to as a “responsible stakeholder.” Has any of that changed from China’s vantage point? 

It’s changed from China’s vantage point, because the US now seems to have gone on a different path. China wants to continue to engage the world, engage the US, and to facilitate globalization in a healthy way. That’s not to say China won’t react and be more defensive, to strengthen its domestic economy and become more self reliant on many critical industries and technologies. That just goes without saying. If the external environment is changing, China of course would adapt.

We’ve also seen a lot of activity in the semiconductor space, and growing concerns both in the US and China about the other country threatening parts of the global supply chain, from antibiotics that are made in China to semiconductors, which are largely designed in America. What’s going on here?

There’s been this weaponization of the global supply chain. The use of the global supply chain for geopolitical purposes is risky and dangerous. Every country has legitimate national security concerns. People should respect that. Countries should respect that. It’s where you draw the line. I can understand that the US is swinging in another direction and prioritizing national security, which is fine. But it is being done in a way that is not well thought out. If it’s seen as weaponizing the global supply chain for geopolitical reasons that cannot be credibly seen as a legitimate national security concern, that would be troubling to the world.

Are you saying these aren’t real national security concerns the US has raised with regard to Huawei? 

I am not an expert, but I for one have not seen any evidence of countries using Huawei products and somehow their security got compromised. We do have documented cases of the US doing this, though: Edward Snowden revealed that! We have also seen eavesdropping on foreign leaders by the US. So we actually do have documented evidence of the US using its dominance in technological infrastructure to breach the security of other countries.

But wouldn’t the US government counter and say that China has been carrying out cyberattacks and stealing intellectual property from global companies and siphoning off personnel data and military secrets from the US government?

Espionage happens around the world. We’re not talking about the same thing.

Well, the US claims it’s not just espionage, and that these are against companies and in pursuit of even scientific data…

I have no idea what’s economic and what’s political. All I’m saying is espionage occurs. And it’s up to the countries to develop a consensus on how to govern that. If we enter a new era, I hope countries can be reasonable and discuss these things and come to agreements on how to conduct themselves. These things have been existing since time immemorial, for thousands of years. Give me a break. I mean, What’s new? Most countries spy on each other. That’s a separate issue from the global supply chain. As I said, I haven’t seen any documented cases or evidence that somehow countries that use Huawei or some Chinese technology and their security got compromised; and that the Chinese state used that to compromise other countries’ security. I really have not seen any case.

Do you think this weaponizing of the supply chain means that China and the US will decouple or have a kind of “splinternet” — a separation of the world wide web?  

Well, certainly there’s a trend towards more barriers, and that’s unfortunate. Certain barriers for legitimate security concerns, I think are to be respected. I mean, China should have them. America should have them. Every country should have them. But it’s important for us to get the balance right and not overreact.

Some American politicians are pushing for the US to de-list Chinese companies from the US stock market because they fail to comply with certain disclosure and accounting standards. Is that a good idea?

I don’t think that’s a good idea, certainly not for the US. Why would America cede its position as the leading destination for raising capital, for the best companies in the world?

Some critics, of course, have said this move could backfire and make the US markets less attractive…

That’s what I’m saying. This goes back to the first of the three problems that I mentioned. In order to hurt your competitors, you hurt yourself more. It’s unnecessary.

For years you have talked and written about how China’s governance model is superior, and right for China. What do people outside of China get wrong about the country’s leaders or the system?  

It’s obvious that China’s governance model has worked for its people. If you can’t admit that you’re just blind to reality; you’re just blinded by your own ideological biases. It’d be crazy to say that China’s governance model has not worked. It has worked, and it’s worked in an unprecedented way in human history. China’s model of political governance has delivered the most significant improvement in living standards, for the largest number of people, in the shortest period of time in history — and it’s continuing to do so. That’s obvious. And it’s also obvious that America’s governance model has been failing. It’s been failing for some time. Otherwise, how do you explain this nearly irrational division in American society, in all spheres of American life? That’s all I have to say about that.

What are the main features of China’s governance model?

There are four key features. First is meritocratic governance. China selects its leaders based on merits. So by the time leaders move up the ranks to run the country, they’ve already run cities and provinces, often totaling tens of millions, if not hundreds of millions, in population. Eventually, they have a proven track record of competence. Second is strategic governance. China thinks for the long term. They don’t think in terms of the next election cycle. Right now, China’s going through its 14th Five Year Plan. And these five year plans work. They have delivered. So they plan for the long term, and they invest for the long term. Also, both the government and the people delay gratification. That’s a main ingredient of success, in personal life and national life, always — the ability to delay gratification and plan for the long term. That’s strategic governance. The third is entrepreneurial governance. You have a lot of innovations at different levels of government all the time, and in different jurisdictions. Different counties and provinces compete to succeed. And the fourth is what I call experimental governance. They conduct experiments before they roll something out. That allows them to innovate. Everybody talks about innovation in Silicon Valley, and that is great. But the most consequential innovations are political innovations, governance innovations. And China has been the biggest laboratory of policy innovations in the world, and it has been that way for a long time. They see a problem, somebody proposes a solution, they take a small place, they experiment, and see how it works. If it doesn’t work, it’s abandoned. If it works with kinks, they fix the kinks, and they try it in some other places. And if it works in those places, they roll it out to two or three provinces. And if that works, they do it nationwide. That’s unique to China’s governance model.

But it seems you’re leaving out a key component of any political system: what say the people have in selecting and evaluating leaders.

Look, I think in terms of outcomes. What works. I’m a businessman. Don’t bother me with things that don’t work. Can you deliver? You can go around the world and tell everyone you’ve got the smartest system in the world, but if it doesn’t deliver the goods, it ain’t smart, right? The outcome is: are people living better? Are people satisfied? Are people happy? Are people optimistic about the future? Do you have legitimacy among your people? Do people believe you when you tell them to wear a mask? Do people trust their political institutions to do what’s best for themselves and for the collective? If you can’t perform and deliver on these, I don’t care how well you sell your procedures and your systems and your power point, it doesn’t work.

I am not an expert, but I for one have not seen any evidence of countries using Huawei products and somehow their security got compromised. We do have documented cases of the US doing this, though: Edward Snowden revealed that!

Could China operate within a democratic framework, or is democracy just not possible in China?

You can be Socratic with me all day long. But if you can’t deliver the goods, you will fail. If you keep delivering the goods, you will continue to succeed.

But is democracy incompatible with that? In China?

I look at democracy in terms of outcome too. A true democracy should deliver the goods to its people. How can you be democratic if you can’t deliver the goods to your people, if you can’t improve the livelihood for a vast majority of people in your country? If you can’t get your people to trust the leadership to do what’s good for themselves and for the country. That’s not democratic.

But you don’t rule out democracy?

China is very democratic. I measure democracy by outcome. Are you succeeding? Is a country succeeding in delivering benefits to a large number of people in that country on a continuous basis? Are you making their lives better, on a continuous basis over long duration? If the answer is yes, the outcome will be very democratic.

Few people outside China would call it a democracy. More likely, they’d describe it as an authoritarian system. Is that what it is?

No. That’s a term coined by Western intellectuals and opinion leaders, and they are not doing any good for their own publics by presenting this misleading idea. It’s a misunderstanding and a misreading of China’s DNA and its political system…

So we shouldn’t refer to China’s system as authoritarian? 

No.

Would it be true to say the Communist Party has a monopoly on power?

Wall Street and Silicon Valley and Hollywood have a monopoly on power in America. That’s what they should say. That’s the American party state. The American party is made up of the Holy Trinity of Wall Street, Silicon Valley and Hollywood. This is precisely why you are seeing such backlash from the American people, which was expressed in the election of 2016, and I might venture to suggest, continues to be expressed even more strongly in the current election, no matter who ends up winning.

Let’s move on to one of the things you wrote recently, about how China’s unique system of governance proved remarkably successful in stifling Covid-19 within the country’s borders. Is that accurate?

Yes. This has been a success. Let’s judge everything by outcome. We had about 4,600 deaths. And the economy is roaring right now, roaring!

And what do you think that shows? 

That shows me two things. One, competence in governance is important. Two, trust in political institutions and leadership among the people is evident. These are the two most important lessons that I drew from the experience. If you are missing one of these two, governance will likely fail. This outcome would not have been possible without them. This outcome is only possible when you have competent political leadership, and when you have a civil society and people who trust their political institutions, and work in concert for the collective good. And we’re talking about 1.4 billion of them.

Were there failures in the early days after the outbreak in Wuhan with China’s handling of the virus, which was allowed to spread far beyond its borders?

You could characterize them as failures. But then that would be the most common failure in the world today. And probably the least severe failure in the world today. Just look around the globe. Wuhan is a second tier city. From the first known case of transmission to the lockdown, it was two and a half to three weeks. And you’ve got to admit that you have extremely imperfect information in those two to three weeks. And look around you [there in the US]. You have had an abundance of information for so long. Look what’s happening! So what’s failure? I mean, failure is relative.

There’s been a great deal of talk lately about how China’s diplomats have, in the wake of the pandemic, engaged in what some have called “wolf warrior diplomacy,” a more aggressive tone and nature in responding to criticism of the country. There are even some who say Eric X. Li was the original “wolf warrior.” Can you talk about that? 

I think it’s exaggerated. Look, sometimes diplomats are frustrated. And they go out and tell it as they see it. And you can call it wolf warrior diplomacy. And sometimes they keep their mouths shut. Maybe you call it silent lamb diplomacy. I mean, come on. America has the biggest wolf warrior leader in history. At the very top. And you’re worried about some suited up Chinese diplomats? Just because they uncharacteristically agitate a little to express their frustrations? Come on. Let’s be serious.

On leadership, China seems to have a paramount leader now, Xi Jinping, and the constitution has been amended to remove term limits, paving the way for Xi to be the country’s permanent ruler. Is that right?

After the constitutional amendment, the system of moving up the ranks and selecting leaders is still very much intact. I don’t think the change to the presidential term limit alters the system in any fundamental way. It doesn’t make anyone leader for life. If you read the constitution, the presidency is largely a symbolic position. The top position in China is General Secretary of the Party, and that position has never had term limits. There are retirement customs that have been followed. They are not exact, and shouldn’t be. It’s important for a country’s institutions to be flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances. But this is not intended to make anyone leader for life. That’s a misreading of what’s happened.

Joe Biden has just been elected the next president of the United States. What are you expecting from a Biden administration? 

I’m hopeful. I hope there will be a period of calm for both countries as they assess things and have a bit of a reset. As I said before, America has this dominance mindset, this hegemonic mindset. I hope a Biden administration will moderate it because it’s just wrong for the American people. And the second, I think, we should have a more thoughtful long term approach from the US. More importantly perhaps is the third problem I wanted to raise earlier, which is the total negligence in the past four years of global problems that cannot be solved without active cooperation between the two countries [the US and China], such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, and now the pandemic. It’s unfortunate that the two countries would not work together on the pandemic. If the two countries had cooperated, we could have saved lives and saved money by reducing the economic impact on both countries, and around the world. But it’s not too late. So global problems have been neglected to a horrible degree. I am confident a Biden administration will correct this. It doesn’t take away from the strategic competition that necessarily exists among all nations, let alone these two great powers. But we could address them and face them rationally, and work out rules of the road. And, [I hope the new administration] sheds this hegemonic mindset, that only one country can run the world. I don’t think that does America any good. America has long been on the losing end of taking on so much. It’s losing its own domestic prosperity and cohesion and the legitimacy of its political institutions among its own people. It’s got all these social problems. How can they solve these consequential and significant problems within America – this is the question. So stop worrying about Hong Kong. Worry about New York and Chicago, and Florida and Pennsylvania.

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