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Ha Jin,¹This is his pen name. His real name is Jin Xuefei the award-winning novelist, was born in north China, served in the People’s Liberation Army, studied English literature in college and then arrived at Brandeis University, near Boston, to study for his PhD. He made several fateful decisions shortly after arriving here in the 1980s: he would write primarily in his second language, English, and he would speak out publicly about what he viewed as the injustices and abuses of the government of his native country. One of those decisions, to write in English, resulted in a series of acclaimed novels, including “Waiting,” winner of the 1999 National Book Award, and “War Trash,” a 2005 finalist for the Pulitzer Prize in fiction. The other, fashioning himself a dissident, has effectively barred him from returning to mainland China. What follows is an edited transcript of our talk, this past summer.

You have often said that you gravitate towards writing about taboo subjects, like Tibet and the Cultural Revolution. Can you tell me how you think about that?² See this excellent interview with Ha Jin in the Paris Review.

To write in English, one cannot mince one’s words.  I have to ignore the taboos imposed by the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] propaganda department.  One of my jobs as a writer is to record truth, so I cannot do otherwise.

And what have you been working on lately?

I just finished a novel about the “tank man.” He was a key figure [in the events surrounding the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989]. I read a lot about him. He seemed very clear headed; very capable, and very good at organizing things. So I wrote this novel but it has not yet been published. I just finished writing the draft. This is a brand new subject for me. But I don’t know how good it is [as a novel].

Why did you decide to write a book about the “Tank Man”?

For a long time, I was curious about this topic. And so for years I was researching this. The writing was quite quick, within a year, but the research was carried out over many years. It’s a very personal book. In fact, it’s a personal book told by a young woman. She’s doing research on this. So it’s just from a very personal angle, because there is so much mystery about this man. [Editor’s note: the identity of the so-called Tank Man, and his fate, remain a mystery. See this PBS documentary]. In a way, he embodies the spirit that most of us seem to have forgotten or shed from our hearts.  Also, he occupies a small center in the Tiananmen Square massacre. There is so much mystery about him, partly because of the suppression of the real information, that I wanted to create a long narrative about his case.

What was the research like?

You know, research can be endless. So I tried to imagine the story, basically a dramatic structure, a kind of arc plot. Once I have that, the beginning, the ending, the complications, the pieces, I have those in my mind. In other words, I have a pattern of a story, a dramatic pattern. Then I would write a draft — a very rough draft. After that, I will do more research. First, I had to do some very basic research to get basic facts right. And then later, the research will be trying to substantiate the story to make it richer and more nuanced. 

That sounds like a fascinating topic, looking back at the events of 1989 in light of what we have seen happen in Hong Kong…

Yes, it is for me. It is such a central topic in contemporary Chinese history.

What are your thoughts, given the events that have unfolded in Hong Kong over the last year, particularly with the new national security law? 

I didn’t expect that it would end up like this. I didn’t, because it clearly was a huge blunder, kind of a crime, in a way, to ruin a city and people’s livelihood this way. It’s a shame. It was clear to me long ago that Hong Kong and the “one country, two systems” approach would never work. And I think behind these events in Hong Kong is the real story: Taiwan. If Hong Kong doesn’t work, how can we expect that Taiwan will go back to China peacefully? That would be impossible. Even the Communists knew that Taiwan would be a major problem. Western politicians knew that too. That’s why a few months ago, the British newspaper, Sunday Express, published a piece that said the British Parliament was considering recognizing Taiwan within five years. I read that as a signal to the Chinese government [from the UK]. This is a way to fight back for England. It would be a natural next step. In fact, there would be enormous consequences because, what if the other European countries follow? Basically, China wouldn’t be able to stop it. 

I thought Xi Jinping would hesitate, or at least play down this a little bit to make this [national security] law somewhat moderate, more acceptable. But instead, he just went ahead and gave such a brutal answer. He acted like a thug; like he doesn’t care. But if Taiwan goes independent he would have to fight. So just after passing the national security law, the Communist Party has been saying they’re “gathering grain” and “recruiting soldiers,” as if they were preparing for a war.

The Hong Kong protests were also a surprise. They grew so large and aggressive, even violent. Have you thought at all about how the Hong Kong movement compares to the pro democracy movement in Tiananmen Square in 1989?

These were not similar at all. The whole thing in Hong Kong started with a small book that described Xi Jinping’s “love affairs.” And then it was just mishandled. And basically, at every juncture the Chinese government failed to reduce the conflict and tension. Beijing could have just stepped out and talked to Hong Kong people, communicated with the people directly. But they couldn’t do it. They were incapable. Even Trump said this could all be resolved in 15 minutes. That implied basically he could just communicate with people directly. 

One of the striking things that people have pointed out about the Hong Kong protests is that they didn’t seem to have as much support over time, and people outside of Hong Kong, particularly from mainland China, didn’t seem to sympathize or understand what was happening. Is that right, that there was much less support outside of Hong Kong?

You’re right. In fact, there was little support [for the movement] on the mainland or from other Chinese, and the interest was not that intense or strong because Hong Kong has been viewed by many as a space where China and the foreign powers could play. Also, the propaganda from China is a big part of it. They said, “The Hong Kong people want independence.” And so, out of patriotism, a lot of people were against the Hong Kong demonstrations and protests. The Communist Party propaganda has really played a major role here. 

In your most recent book, you hinted at or talked about the possibility that the Communist Party could reach critics outside of China. Some commentators said this did not seem very realistic. But now, we are beginning to hear more about how China carries out “foreign influence” operations overseas, and seeks to threaten or punish individuals for what they say publicly about China, even overseas. There’s a chilling effect and it has far reaching consequences, even for public discourse, even on American university campuses. Is this true?

Yes. And not only in Chinese publications but in English publications as well. For instance there is something called the China Quarterly, which is published at Cambridge University [Press]. But basically, they [had a controversy several years ago over a decision to] censor articles, following Chinese government pressure. [Editor’s note: Cambridge University Press later reversed that decision after consulting with the editors of the China Quarterly]. In fact, for many years the Chinese government has wanted to police the world. They want to replace the United States. They felt the rules of the game and the order were established by the United States. So in order to be treated fairly, the [Chinese] government decided they have to set up rules by themselves. That’s why they now want to police the entire world, every part, culturally and socially. They’ve reached out in every direction. 

Is this what you were referring to earlier with the Hong Kong book sellers, who were publishing and selling books critical of Chinese officials? We now know that some of those booksellers were abducted and sent back to China, and that some Hong Kong journalists were attacked by thugs. Is this what you’re referring to?

Yes, ultimately because this is manifest in the 38th column in the national security law. Everyone outside of China can be considered a possible criminal.

Is this new or is this something that we just didn’t understand in earlier years? Did something change about the Communist Party’s position?

I think we just didn’t understand the nature of the Communist Party. They always tried to be the number one, a superpower that can rule the world. 

Does that have any effect on your own books or writing? Are your books even available inside China?

About a third of my books have appeared in mainland China because they were published in simplified Chinese. But these versions are different from books of mine that are published in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The mainland versions, I don’t really care about them because I feel the teeth of each of those books were pulled out. The [censors] cut [what they said were] “sensitive” sentences and paragraphs.

Are your books published in Hong Kong? 

Hong Kong and Taiwan have basically the same system, and publish in traditional Chinese characters. So they’re available in Hong Kong but they cannot be taken through customs into mainland China.  

What about your own situation? Since you moved here in the 1980s, how often have you been back to China? Or, perhaps I should ask, have you been back?

No, I can’t go back. I’ve been here almost 35 years. I’ve never been back. Not since ‘85. And even when my parents passed away, I was not allowed to go back for the funerals. I went to the Chinese Consulate in New York many, many times, and every time they just told me a few sentences. They dismissed my application. They later informed me indirectly that I was on a list, and that my case must be reviewed by the national security department of China and that the [Chinese] Foreign Ministry has no power to interfere with that.

Your books had not even come out in the mid 1980s, so your trouble really stems from what happened during or shortly after the pro-democracy demonstrations in or after June 1989, while you were outside of China. Is that correct?

A: Yes, I was very outspoken. So I was not allowed to go back. Later I visited Taiwan and Chen Shui-bian, the former president, received me. So that was another reason I was not allowed to go back. While I was in Taiwan, I was asked publicly, “What do you think about Taiwan’s independence?” And I said, “I don’t know. That’s the people’s choice. Their will is the mandate. It’s not something I can comment on…” So the Chinese government heard that and they were very angry about it.

You’ve said before that the events of June 1989 had a tremendous effect on your life, and work. What were you doing in Boston at the time? 

I was a PhD student at Brandeis, completing my dissertation. I was planning to go back to teach in my former university, but the Tiananmen Square massacre changed everything. I wrote a novel about that massacre though, “The Crazed,” which must have contributed to my exile.  

So you’ve been writing about China, from the United States, in English for all these years, decades really. How has your perception of your homeland changed during that period? You are unable to visit, but you’re aware of the dramatic changes in the economy, in the power of the Communist Party, and the wealth of many of its citizens now. You can perhaps see it on TV, or in the movies or on the internet. Can you talk about that?

When I came to the United States, I planned to go back. I had a good job there. And I didn’t know the Chinese government could be that brutal — that ruthless, especially in 1989. [Back then], I was basically, for weeks, in a kind of trance. And that was the turning point. I just couldn’t serve such a government anymore. I couldn’t.  And later, of course, China was getting stronger and bigger and its influence was everywhere. I am aware of the differences, but I don’t have the physical sense of the place. 

What’s remarkable is that after 1989, China managed to win over much of the West, with its economic reforms and its development and influence through trade, etc. It was a remarkable turnaround from talk about the “butchers of Beijing,” to what we saw at the Beijing Olympics in 2008, this coming out party… 

I was disappointed, you know. China won over the West because the West was too practical and just wanted to make a profit and do business. And Deng Xiaoping was very shrewd. He managed to turn things around. Also, he did it in a way that [has even] emboldened the current [Chinese] leaders. They thought the West had no principles, no spine. And they were right, to some degree. That’s why they played the business card. You see, even when they came to negotiate with [Secretary of State Mike] Pompeo, they only talked about business deals. The same mentality continues. 

You mean they realized that human rights and democracy and free speech weren’t really as important as business and trade?

That’s right. They were not. The truth is, for instance, if they do a really big trade agreement, like $300 billion, I think most [U.S. presidential] administration’s will be bought over. So the profit interest was a big part of this, I believe.

I’ve met many people who moved from China to the U.S. in the 1980s, and I’ve noticed lately that many of them have also come to see China in a different light, partly because of the remarkable changes that have taken place. They may have been critical in the 1980s, when China was struggling, but they seem less critical now. Have you noticed anything similar?

That’s true in a way because there’s also a sense of hopelessness. What can you do? I think that is part of it too. They’re no longer that passionate, not that devoted to the original ideals. That’s true. And so, there’s a uselessness and a hopelessness. I think that is quite prevalent among [those in the generation that came here in the 1980s]. 

What about the students who come to the U.S. from China? 

The younger people care more about a good job and their own life. They are also more patriotic. Many of them are quite against the U.S. And so they are different, very different in that sense. And many of them are in practical fields, like economics or finance or the hard sciences. So their minds seem to be heavily influenced by the education they got back in China.

Speaking of universities, the F.B.I. and the U.S. Department of Justice have stepped up their scrutiny of American campuses in an effort to root out “spies” and prevent the Chinese military from gaining access to dual-use technologies. The U.S. authorities have also raised alarms about the risks of thefts from government funded health or medical institutions. Now, on American campuses, there’s a sense that this could lead to racial profiling and discrimination against Chinese students and faculty members… Is this dangerous? 

It could get out of hand. But it makes no sense in the humanities and social sciences. Their getting that information would only lead to good results. (chuckles) They’d get beneficial information. 

Before you left China, you served in the People’s Liberation Army. Can you say anything about the role of the PLA in business or its relationship to the Party?

So let’s be clear on Huawei and ZTE. These companies appear merely as technology companies, but in fact, the PLA is behind them. The military is a big part of the Chinese life. And they are everywhere. That’s why I couldn’t tolerate this after the Tiananmen massacre, because we were supposed to be the People’s Army, but [the PLA] was really only serving the Party. That’s why I believe a company like Huawei should be banned [from the U.S.]. There’s a Chinese law that says every citizen must cooperate and must surrender useful information to the government. 

So what you’re saying is, although there may not be evidence to show that Huawei is part of the PLA it may not matter, right?

Yes.

By the way, how do you describe your experience when you were in the PLA? Did you enjoy it? Did you dislike it? What was your experience?

I was at the front, very close to Russia, near Vladivostok. And things were very tense at the time. There were the skirmishes between the Chinese army and the Soviets. The time was very hard, and when it was cold we didn’t have decent food. But life was simple and clear because we were there to defend the country against the Russians. But later, we learned that  everything was kind of silly. We know that because the top leaders did play tricks and they made maneuvers. They’d created a crisis.

And how did you feel when you left?

 My experience was pretty good. I enjoyed being in the military at that time, or briefly, I would say two or three years. But later, as I began to learn more about the situation there, I could see what a waste of life it was…

For someone who served in the military, is there any possibility of a real conflict between the US and China? 

Yes. The Cold War is already going on. There might be a hot war, but what kind of war we don’t know. There is a Chinese professor on the mainland at Renmin University [Jin Canrong]. He’s close to Xi Jinping. He’s kind of a spokesman for Xi Jinping. And he said a lot about what is basically [an effort] to try to threaten the United States. He says something like, “You can wipe us out 10 times, but it’ll be enough for us to wipe you out once.” So they entice the nuclear weapon. And it’s still true that the CCP has become very aggressive in that sense. And that’s why I said the issue of the national security law in Hong Kong has come to such a terrible conclusion. And that means the Chinese government would not hesitate to attack Taiwan, if it went independent. There could clearly be a hot war over the Taiwan Straits.

This is a pretty grim outlook. I guess that is the state of world affairs now. 

The Chinese government is very stupid and very aggressive. They don’t know how dangerous or precarious the situation is. They seem to lack common sense.

Many people said that big changes would come to China after they entered the World Trade Organization. Manufacturing would move to China, and it would integrate into the global economy, and perhaps even become a more democratic nation. Was it a mistake to think that way? 

People didn’t see the true colors of the Chinese government and the military. They really viewed the US as an enemy for decades. And that’s why I’ve said that, basically the best way is to change the top leaders. I don’t believe in rebels, the masses. Leaders can make a difference. Since Xi came to power, everything has just basically gone down the drain. It’s time to replace him.

What are your thoughts on Miles Kwok, aka Guo Wengui, the fugitive billionaire who has teamed up with Steve Bannon to denounce the CCP? He really has a lot of people divided. Some see him as courageous and others as a pretender who spins fanciful tales. Have you met him? Do you support him?

I met him once and like him. He is a brave and smart man, though I cannot say everything he said is true.  He’s a businessman and has a great deal of practical concerns. These days I don’t follow his broadcasts anymore, but he has contributed quite a bit to the exposing of the CCP’s corruption.

Finally, what, if anything, has the Chinese Communist Party done right? Many have argued that they lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, that they built up enormous wealth and capabilities and made things more affordable for global consumers. Is there anything you think they’ve done really well or admirable?

They composed a decent constitution, which they have never followed but which provides the Chinese citizens with a concrete reference to their rights.

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