
Emmanuel Macron’s controversial remarks in an interview at the end of his recent visit to China have shaken the sense of unity around the European Union’s approach towards Beijing. This is unfortunate, given the French President’s apparent intention to project the exact opposite, by inviting the EU Commission’s president Ursula von der Leyen to join him on his visit — and given the opportunity he missed to support the agenda of de-risking relations with China that she had proposed just days before the visit.
Yet despite being problematic and ill-timed, Macron’s comments have served to put the spotlight on three key challenges the EU needs to address in order to develop and communicate a clear and more coherent China policy. This task is particularly pressing as more European leaders are set for their own engagements with Beijing, as its diplomatic reopening picks up pace.
In the interview Macron lobbied for doubling down on the EU’s strategic autonomy, and for widening the geopolitical window of opportunity to implement it. Otherwise, Macron argued, “[we] will become vassals whereas we can be the third pole” amid the emerging Sino-American “duopoly”, a reference to the EU’s dependency on the United States. Such a vision of strategic autonomy is problematic as it echoes anti-American interpretations of the concept that Beijing has consistently promoted. It also shakes trust in the alignment of the transatlantic partners, potentially limiting any deterrent effect towards both Beijing’s and Moscow’s ambitions to reshape the rules-based international order.
Macron also failed to communicate a clear stance on the importance of stability in the Taiwan Strait, something that is routinely referenced in the EU’s diplomatic statements as being fundamental for Europe’s economic security and geopolitical stability. Instead, he merely emphasized the need for the EU to prevent “accelerating the Taiwan issue”, suggesting that the EU would be reluctant to get involved in any potential conflict in the Strait given that it needs stability and time to build up its own strategic autonomy capabilities.
The EU needs to project strategic clarity on China and its transatlantic relations in order to develop its geopolitical standing, but that effort stands in constant jeopardy given its reliance on member states’ capitals willingness to hold the same communication line.
These statements could hardly have been more poorly timed, coming at the end of a visit that had resulted in numerous Sino-French business deals, and which came on the heels of Xi Jinping’s own trip to Moscow, during which he signaled his intention to jointly drive changes “the likes of which we haven’t seen in a century”. It also coincided with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army launching another three-day military drill in the Taiwan Straits.
Still, Macron’s interview should be taken with something of a pinch of salt, given his history of proposing grand visions and stirring debate through deliberately provocative statements that ultimately do not constitute a policy shift (previous examples include his infamous remarks on NATO’s “brain death”). However, while intellectually stimulating, such remarks hardly constitute responsible strategic communication from one of the key European leaders.
And herein lies the problem —the EU’s strategic communications vulnerability. The EU needs to project strategic clarity on China and its transatlantic relations in order to develop its geopolitical standing, but that effort stands in constant jeopardy given its reliance on member states’ capitals willingness to hold the same communication line. To paraphrase Kissinger’s famous question about European leadership, “if you want to know what the EU thinks on China, who do you listen to?” Macron on his own does not speak for the entire EU.
This should not distract from the fact that some of the themes raised by the French President do resonate with the concerns of many in Brussels and in European capitals. Namely, how should the EU navigate the geo-economic and geopolitical environment that has been reshaped by the Sino-American rivalry, in order to avoid losing its competitiveness and relevance over the long term? Getting China policy right is a very important piece of this puzzle.
To do so, the EU and its member states need to develop commonly approved positions and messages on three key challenges:
- Deterrence and stability – The EU should establish clearly defined and communicated geopolitical red lines, along with developing deterrence measures to prevent actors like China or Russia from crossing them. This will entail creating a common, assertive diplomatic response to Beijing’s increasingly assertive position towards Taiwan and its continued support for Moscow amid its invasion of Ukraine. It should allow continued dialogue with China, while dissuading Beijing from taking even more disruptive actions.
- Economic security and competitiveness – The EU should limit its strategic dependencies and vulnerabilities in critical supply chains, including rare earths, and define what types of economic engagement with China are desirable. It also needs to manage the impact of U.S.-China industrial competition — including measures such as the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act or the increasing use of export controls — on its economy.
- Bloc building and transatlantic relations – The EU should calibrate its transatlantic cooperation with the U.S. to navigate differences in their respective China policies. This effort needs to run in parallel with expanding constructive engagement on China-related concerns with like-minded partners, and intensified outreach to Global South partners to ensure the resilience of the rules-based international order.
Fine tuning the EU’s new China policy and its strategic narrative is no easy task, but President von der Leyen’s proposal of “de-risking” relations with China can be the right starting point. In essence, the proposal is to de-risk, not decouple from China by mitigating strategic dependencies. It calls upon the EU to use instruments for defending and protecting its economy more effectively, while at the same time advocating frank and assertive dialogue with China, and remaining open to targeted cooperation on issues of common interest such as concrete climate action or economic cooperation that is deemed not risky (albeit the debate where to draw that line is still not fully resolved within the EU).
In the end, something good could still come out of Macron’s unfortunate comments: they have led to a revived sense of urgency that European capitals must discuss how to develop a coherent, easy-to-communicate strategic agenda on China.
Macron’s statements after his China trip were undoubtedly a communications debacle that created an exaggerated impression of EU’s disunity. In reality, since the EU first referred to China as a “partner, competitor and systemic rival” in 2019, the bloc has been creating a substantive set of policies that address many of the challenges in its relations with China. Just recently, the EU Commission proposed a new Critical Raw Materials Act, which aims to address Europe’s vulnerabilities in crucial supply chains. The recent release of a list of projects for the Global Gateway, a major high-quality development initiative and a response China’s Belt and Road Initiative, is another case in point.
Important steps have also been taken to achieve more political alignment among EU member states on the bloc’s strategic objectives. The EU has published an Indo-Pacific Strategy and its own “Strategic Compass”, major policy papers that have helped to define a common foreign policy outlook — including on China. So while EU member states are not fully aligned, they also are not totally disunited either, with common groundwork already being laid down. A single controversial interview by one European leader should not overshadow the constructive work being done in the background.
In the end, something good could still come out of Macron’s unfortunate comments: they have led to a revived sense of urgency that European capitals must discuss how to develop a coherent, easy-to-communicate strategic agenda on China. Von der Leyen’s de-risking proposal may not seem perfect for all of them, but it is a good starting point for moving forward a discussion that can no longer be put off in a world of increasing geopolitical tensions.

Grzegorz Stec is an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), whose research focuses on EU-China relations, including their institutional framework, strategic discourse deployed by the two sides and the EU’s common foreign policy building efforts.