Bonnie S. Glaser is director of the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, where she focuses on China’s foreign and security policy. Before that, she was a senior adviser for Asia and director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. She is also a nonresident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia. Glaser has also served as a consultant for the State Department and the Department of Defense. She has a B.A. from Boston University and a Master’s in international relations and Chinese studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
Illustration by Lauren Crow
Q: At this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue you asked Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, “What are the steps that the United States, our allies, and Taiwan need to take to bolster deterrence so that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait can be preserved?” I want to begin by posing that question back to you.
A: The United States needs to have a credible capability to defend Taiwan and we need to ensure that we can come to Taiwan’s defense in a reasonable period of time. We need to make sure that the Chinese believe that we can defend Taiwan. People talk about developing a strategy of denial — denying the PLA the capability to seize and control Taiwan — that is a goal that I share. But in the near term, I don’t think we can develop that capability.
While we are trying to build out this credible capability to defend Taiwan and adopt a strategy of denial, we need to have the capability to increase costs. We have to signal to China that it will pay unacceptable costs if it uses force against Taiwan. We can do this in a variety of ways. The Biden administration is already, for example, trying to get other countries to be more vested in security in the Taiwan Strait and other countries like Japan, South Korea, the G7, and the EU have all adopted language in statements that indicate that they have an interest in the preservation of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Signaling that these countries care about maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait is crucial. The international community should signal that it is willing to implement very harsh sanctions akin to those that have been imposed on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine, in order to demonstrate in advance the kinds of costs that China would incur if it were to invade Taiwan.
| BIO AT A GLANCE | |
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| BIRTHPLACE | Brooklyn, New York, USA |
| CURRENT POSITION | Director, Asia Program, German Marshall Fund of the United States |
Another set of issues is what Taiwan must do to deter an invasion, and we can help Taiwan, but they have to put in their own resources. We can supply them with asymmetric military equipment and perhaps provide more training, but Taiwan has to do its part to signal that it has the determination to defend itself. They have to bolster their reserves — something that they are just beginning to do with a trial program to have their reservists serve more time, engage in night training, as well as train with more active-duty forces. Moreover, they need to draw some lessons from Ukraine regarding the need for a Civilian Territorial Defense Force, which Ukraine did not have before the invasion. But there are other countries that do, like Finland, Sweden, and the Baltic states, where civilians are trained how to shoot, provide military first aid, and other skills that could be done to actually defend the country in case the PLA lands on the beach and the people of Taiwan are forced to be part of the effort to defend it.
Economics should be seen as inextricably linked to military security and we are not doing enough to support Taiwan economically. The Biden administration has created some new mechanisms and also inherited some from the Trump administration, but we still have no negotiations with Taiwan aimed at signing a free trade agreement. This is something that is long overdue because prosperity for Taiwan is extremely important — it is inextricably linked to its security — and there’s no reason why we shouldn’t sign a free trade agreement with Taiwan. We should encourage our allies and partners to enhance their interactions with Taiwan, including in the economic realm, but we also need to do that ourselves.
Do you think that a free trade agreement can also act as a deterrent to China?
One of the most important reasons that the United States should sign a free trade agreement with Taiwan is not necessarily because we would benefit enormously economically. The data that I’m familiar with suggests that there would be some benefit but it would be small. The most important benefit would be to give other countries cover to negotiate trade deals with Taiwan. So countries like Australia and Japan, that probably would benefit even more economically than us, would probably be more willing to negotiate a TFA [trade facilitation agreement] with Taiwan if the United States takes the lead.
Taiwan is a member of the World Trade Organization, and as a member it has the right to sign free trade agreements with other WTO members. This is not unprecedented. In 2013, both New Zealand and Singapore signed an FTA with Taiwan. They’re technically called Economic Partnership Agreements. So this can be done in ways that ensure that it is consistent with WTO rules and is limited to the economic and trade realms. For example, any agreement should use Taiwan’s moniker within the WTO: The “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei).” The United States should not refrain from negotiating an agreement because it might be seen as provocative toward China. If there is anything that we can justify, it is a trade agreement with Taiwan.
In addition to sanctioning Russia in response to the invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. and its allies were quick to send military aid to Ukraine. Can the U.S. and its allies preemptively send military aid to Taiwan without provoking China?
In the case of Ukraine, it has been relatively easy to resupply the military and there have been many countries contributing to that effort. In the case of Taiwan, we know that it would be extremely difficult to resupply Taiwan once a war begins. China would likely impose a blockade and prevent any supply ships from getting through and it would be very difficult to supply by air because China would have control of the airspace. So that really puts a premium on ensuring that Taiwan has munitions and other materiel that are pre-positioned in very large numbers. In some cases, Taiwan might be able to produce some of this equipment by itself in large quantities and store it underground. But in other cases, the U.S. needs to think about supplying it to Taiwan in peacetime.
| MISCELLANEA | |
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| FAVORITE BOOK | The Outlander Series by Diana Gabaldon |
| FAVORITE MUSIC | A broad range of 1970s music, from Pink Floyd to Carly Simon |
| FAVORITE FILMS | 2001: A Space Odessey, 8 1/2, and Avatar |
What I want to emphasize going forward is that we need to understand in a more granular way than we do today what deters China and what provokes China, because we want to be sure that what we are doing will strengthen deterrence rather than undermine it.
How do you evaluate the use of “strategic ambiguity” after President Biden’s recent comments assuring the defense of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion?
We have to recall that we had a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan from 1954 to 1979. We broke that treaty, which had an Article Five commitment to Taiwan, as part of the terms of normalization with the PRC. If we were to reinstate an Article Five type commitment to Taiwan’s defense, I worry that Xi Jinping would conclude that since he now has a conventional military advantage, he might see that he has a window of opportunity and conclude that he should act against Taiwan, rather than wait while the United States reconstitutes its military capability in Asia and applies new technologies to weapons systems to effectively counter anti-access area denial capabilities. If the United States changes its declaratory policy by adopting “strategic clarity,” but lacks a credible capability to defend Taiwan, then we may provoke the attack on Taiwan that we seek to deter.
…everything that I have ever heard or read about PLA planning suggests that they assume U.S. military intervention.
Another factor is that the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity has evolved to serve our interest in dual-deterrence. The U.S. opposes actions to change the status quo by either side of the Taiwan Strait. Although Washington has full confidence in the commitment of Taiwan’s current president to preserving the status quo, it does not want to give Taiwan a blank check. The U.S. does not want to signal that no matter what Taipei does, no matter what kind of policies they pursue, that we would come to their defense. We also want Taiwan to have an incentive to expend greater resources to defend itself, and not conclude, “oh, the United States will come save us.”
Adopted strategic clarity carries unacceptable risks and would not necessarily strengthen deterrence. Strategic ambiguity has successfully kept the peace across the Taiwan Strait since 1979. Proponents of strategic clarity argue that the Chinese could miscalculate and think that the United States would not intervene in the Taiwan Strait, in part because we didn’t send American forces to defend Ukraine. Therefore, they advocate adopting strategic clarity so there will be no such miscalculation. My response to that is that the PLA has been planning for U.S. intervention in a Taiwan Strait contingency since at least the 1990s. They have to prepare for the worst case and everything that I have ever heard or read about PLA planning suggests that they assume U.S. military intervention.
What do you make of the claim made by U.S. defense officials that China is prepared to invade Taiwan by 2027?
At the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi Jinping set out two targets. One was a set of goals for 2035 and the other was for a set of goals for 2049. The 2035 goals included that the PLA should basically complete national defense and military modernization. By 2049, the goal for the PLA was to have a world-class military. The 2027 goal was not put forward at the 19th Party Congress. The 2027 goal was unveiled at the Fifth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee. It’s widely misinterpreted as indicating that CCP moved forward the 2035 goal of achieving defense and military modernization to 2027.
The 2027 goal is a short-term marker that’s essentially intended to serve two objectives. First, it is to ensure that the military modernization campaign remains on track and to mark the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PLA. It is a reminder that military modernization is a high priority. Second, it’s to inform the international community of China’s growing power. This is part of China’s narrative to the world about the ever-growing strength of the Chinese military.
In my own research, I have not found any evidence that the PLA 2027 goal is linked to either a capability or an intent to invade Taiwan. Testifying before Congress in March of 2021, then Admiral Phil Davidson, who was in his final months serving as commander of Indo-Pacific Command, stated that the threat to Taiwan is manifest during this decade and then he added, “in fact in the next six years.” Three months later, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley told Congress that he believed 2027 is a timeline for developing capabilities, but he said he didn’t see any evidence of intent or decision-making to attack or seize Taiwan. He did, however, repeat the claim that China has moved up the 2035 timeline to 2027 and he claimed that Xi Jinping stated this in a speech. I have yet to find that speech. I asked Department of Defense officials to provide evidence that 2027 is a goal for a PRC takeover of Taiwan and I have yet to receive a reply.
How do you view the possibility of the U.S. organizing a NATO equivalent for the Pacific? Would this quell or increase tension with China?
We need to forge a coalition of countries to push back against many Chinese policies, including its pressure on Taiwan, to deter Chinese attacks on Taiwan. Bringing countries together into multilateral mechanisms, whether they be economic or security mechanisms, such as the Quad, is extremely important because collective actions are likely to be more effective than unilateral steps. However, countries in the region do not favor a NATO equivalent for the Pacific. They continuously say they don’t want to be forced to choose, especially smaller countries that are situated geographically close to China. They want to be on amicable terms with Beijing while also developing close ties with major powers to balance China. They want to preserve their room to maneuver and they fear that intense U.S.-China strategic competition will reduce their ability to protect their own interests. Building a NATO-like organization would undermine U.S. efforts to establish and strengthen coalitions of like-minded countries to protect their shared interests. Even Japan, our closest ally in the Indo-Pacific, would not support a NATO-like alliance. We would end up isolating ourselves and undermining our effectiveness.
What are your biggest takeaways from the invasion of Ukraine and what it means for China’s ambitions for Taiwan?
Since the war is still ongoing, it is a bit premature to draw certain conclusions about Russia’s performance. China studies foreign wars in great depth and they do not draw rash conclusions about them. They will eventually apply some lessons from the war to the PLA, be that in training, doctrine, operational concepts, or even in military equipment. I’m inclined to believe that China has its own timeline for Taiwan which probably won’t be fundamentally changed because of what is happening in Ukraine. But Xi Jinping cannot help but see that it will not be easy to use military force to achieve political goals.
In the absence of a perceived threat of Taiwan independence, Xi Jinping is unlikely to attack Taiwan unless he has a high degree of confidence that it would succeed.
The PLA has 100 miles of ocean to cross to invade Taiwan and that task is much harder than the land war that Russia has faced in Ukraine. So, there is a possibility that the war in Ukraine will make Beijing somewhat more cautious because there is a risk of failure with attendant consequences for the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. In the absence of a perceived threat of Taiwan independence, Xi Jinping is unlikely to attack Taiwan unless he has a high degree of confidence that it would succeed.
One of the lessons we don’t want China to draw from the war is that the U.S. is fearful of intervening in a conflict with a country that has a substantial nuclear capability. A major concern that we need to have going forward is how China may interpret the decision of the United States to not intervene in Ukraine. Indeed, President Biden said at the outset of this war, even before it started, that the United States would not send military forces to Ukraine and this was widely believed to be because the United States didn’t want to risk a nuclear war with Russia. We know that China is substantially increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal. One lesson we don’t want China to draw is that as they grow their nuclear arsenal, they can intimidate the United States and prevent us from intervening because we would be fearful of engaging in a nuclear war with China as a substantial nuclear power.
How do you evaluate the seemingly hollow promises Xi Jinping made to President Obama to not militarize the South China Sea in 2016. How should the U.S. react to further militarization in the South China Sea?
If the United States had an opportunity to prevent China’s militarization of the South China Sea, it would have had to have happened before Xi Jinping stood alongside President Obama in the White House Rose Garden in September 2015 and said that he had no intent to militarize the South China Sea. I met with a senior military officer a day or two after Xi Jinping made that statement, and the officer implicitly criticized Xi Jinping, saying that “the South China Sea is already militarized” — it was already too late. The United States would have had to have taken action to prevent China from dredging and building the islands before Xi Jinping showed up and met with President Obama and made that statement. The Chinese began to implement their plan in December 2013, so by 2015 they had made significant progress toward changing the status quo in the South China Sea and the Obama administration did not take action to dissuade China until later. Toward the end of the Obama administration, there was a report that the Chinese were sending dredgers towards Scarborough Shoal, and that we believed they had the intention to build another base on Scarborough Shoal. Reportedly, President Obama told Xi Jinping that there would be severe consequences if they carried out another effort to dredge and militarize an island. According to the reports at the time, the dredgers turned back. That raises the question that if President Obama had been more firm and threatened consequences very early on, perhaps we could have deterred the militarization of the South China Sea. Today, we cannot prevent China from further militarizing those islands if they choose to do so.
The tensions between the U.S. and China have increased dramatically over the past decade. What do you think influenced this acute increase in tension?
China has always wanted to achieve national greatness and rejuvenation. When they judged their power to be significantly less than that of the United States, the Chinese were willing to continue to pursue Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of “hide your capabilities and bide your time.”
This really began to change with the global financial crisis in 2008 as China began to assess that the United States was beginning a period of decline. Some even thought at the time that it would be a precipitous decline. After a time, they concluded that the United States was in relative decline, but that China’s comprehensive national power would continue to grow and eventually close the gap. This change in their assessment of the balance of power emboldened China to start undertaking actions to advance their interests in ways that they had previously refrained from doing. We saw this accelerate under Xi Jinping, even though it started under Hu Jintao.
Bonnie Glaser testified before the Senate Small Business and Entrepreneurship Committee on “Made in China 2025 and the Future of American Industry”, 27th February, 2019. Credit: Center for Strategic & International Studies via YouTube.
Xi Jinping has relied on some successful strategies to advance China’s comprehensive national power. One of them is to become the leader of the world in core strategic technologies of the 21st century. The Made in China 2025 plan identified 10 different areas of technology that if China were to become dominant in, would help to catapult them to become the most powerful country in the world. Xi Jinping understood the connection between technology and power very early. He also created the Military-Civil Fusion Program, recognizing that a smooth application of civilian technology to the military would bolster China’s capabilities militarily. That’s just an example of a strategy that Xi Jinping has pursued that appears to be bearing fruit.
If the tension is correlated with increased Chinese ambition, is there anything the U.S. can do to alleviate tension?
We have to start by restoring America’s strength, which has been the priority of the Biden administration since the day that they entered office. This is why they talk about our strategy toward China as “invest, align and compete” — invest in America. If we can restore American power, then we can alter China’s assessment that the United States is in decline and we may be able to change China’s calculus that the balance of power is in its favor. That is very difficult to accomplish. But I think that it is fundamental to influencing China’s choices.
Another way is alignment and strengthening coalitions with other countries. What we can bring to bear against China ourselves is far less than what we can bring to bear when working together with other countries. Biden administration officials say they seek to shape the environment around China and that they want to do that with our allies and partners. What we can try to signal is that if China goes down a path that is damaging to the vision we share with allies and partners, China will pay a price. We have to be able to impose costs for that behavior.
This is a work in progress. Any administration cannot shape China’s choices in a very short period of time and success is certainly not assured. And we cannot change Chinese ambitions, we can only change their cost-benefit calculus. A potentially realistic goal is persuading China to pursue its ambitions by abiding by international law, rather than trying to circumvent it. They could compete economically for example, without seeking to provide massive subsidies to their companies or stealing intellectual property.
China has long held the ambition to fully get beyond its century of national humiliation and restore China to greatness. This is something that Xi Jinping very much wants to achieve, if not himself while he is in power, then ensure that the country is on an irreversible path to achieving that goal by 2049.
Garrett O’Brien is a student at Harvard University studying how China interacts with the rest of the world. His research interests include Chinese international development projects and financial regulation.
