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Lyu Jinghua is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C., where she researches cybersecurity and U.S.-China defense relations. She served in the People’s Liberation Army for over twenty years, retiring as a colonel. In the last decade of her career, she was a United States analyst at the PLA’s Academy of Military Science in Beijing. She participated in a variety of international defense summits, including the Xiangshan Forum, Shangrila Dialogue, and Seoul Defense Dialogue, as a PLA delegate. In this lightly edited interview with Lyu, who is currently in Beijing, we discuss defense relations, technology competition, and the U.S. election.

How did you end up at Carnegie? 

I’m a retired colonel in the People’s Liberation Army. My last position was as a research fellow at the Center for China-U.S. Defense Relations at the Academy of Military Science as a researcher. In 2016, I retired and started thinking about having a very different type of career. I spent over a year at the Pangoal Institution, a social science think tank in China, and in 2018 joined Carnegie as a visiting scholar working with the Cyber Policy Initiative research team. My research is focused on China-U.S. cyber stability.

When I was in China, my job was trying to make people in China, especially in the military, understand better what the U.S. was doing and the logic for doing that. Not only describing the policies, but also what has driven the U.S. to adopt them, and what that means to the world and what that means to China. When I was in China, I was trying to give Chinese people a voice that they don’t hear very often about the United States. But when I got to the U.S., my job changed to giving the Western audience a voice from China.  I hope what I’m doing can give people in the West another voice, to let them know there is a different way to view the issues happening in cyberspace.

How did it feel to be working in Washington at a time when there is so much animosity towards China? 

It depended on the people. I always tell my peers here in China that we need to avoid using the world “American” to understand policy. Different interest groups have different interests and different understandings of the best way to engage China. 

Most of my time was spent at Carnegie, and the scholars at Carnegie had excellent analyses based on their expertise, not based just on perceptions. They understood the issues. I think their research made a lot of sense. And most of the academic exchanges I had made good sense, too. There are disagreements, of course, but I don’t think disagreements are unacceptable. Some of the disagreements came from misunderstanding, and that made the academic exchange more meaningful. Some of the disagreement came from different national interests, and that’s totally reasonable. Even though we don’t agree with each other, that doesn’t mean we have to be adversaries.

But there are some arguments that aren’t reasonable. What really makes me worried is the people using ideology as their main argument. They argued that as long as China is a Communist Party-ruled country, it can never be a counterpart [of the United States]. It can never be a peaceful or friendly country. People [in the U.S.] are more and more used to using ideology as the standard to discuss the relationship. That’s something I feel is very dangerous. There is no space for negotiation there; all the other areas can be discussed, but the political regime is something that is not up for debate. If that is the standard, that will make the relationship very difficult to continue.

As you look at the U.S.-China relationship today, what do you think about the two countries’ military to military relations?

In the 1990s, general relations were improving very fast, but military relations were lagging behind. Now it’s the reverse. In the past decade, even though there are a lot of frustrations between the two militaries, they are actually collaborating very well. The basic reason that drives them to work together is both sides have recognized the potential risks of getting into a war because of misunderstanding. Risk management, or crisis management, became the basic common ground for the two militaries to collaborate. The demand for crisis management is only increasing today. Even though there could be a lot of difficult issues, the two militaries still have a driving force to work together.

But the basic reason there is still tension between the two militaries is because the gap in strength is shrinking. Overall military capabilities are still far apart — China isn’t thinking of catching up with the overall capabilities of the United States. But what we are seeing now is there could be a balance of power within the First Island Chain. [The first island chain is the first set of major islands out from the Asian continent’s eastern coast, stretching roughly from Japan to Borneo. China’s military doctrine sees this as a critical area to secure and control access to.] As power balances within the First Island Chain, the two militaries must find a way to peacefully coexist in this area. So, I think it’s very important for the two militaries to think about what an acceptable balance of power between the two militaries within this area is.

The Taiwan Strait is the riskiest area for the two militaries. China has reiterated that the peaceful reunification of Taiwan is the core interest of China. [However, Xi Jinping has said that military options remain on the table.] So, if there is any action taken that makes the Chinese government feel that peaceful reunification could be endangered, China has to react.

But what deserves more attention is the South China Sea, because in the South China Sea we can see almost all the flashpoints between the two militaries. For example, the balance of power is a flashpoint. China thinks America is trying to block China within the First Island Chain, while Americans fear that China will just try to push the U.S. military out of this area. Another flashpoint is alliances. China can accept the existence of alliances, but using alliances to suppress China is something that is unacceptable. That is what we are seeing in the South China Sea. The third flashpoint is freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs). I don’t think China has total disagreement to all FONOPs, but some of the FONOPs are actually trying to touch the bottom line of China’s sovereignty [the U.S. Navy occasionally pilots ships through the Taiwan Strait and near disputed islands in the South China Sea claimed by China, which China maintains infringes on its sovereignty]. And those are viewed by China as unacceptable. All these differences are reflected in the South China Sea. I really think it deserves more attention to make sure accidents or conflict don’t break out.

Finally, even though the two militaries are interacting within the Asia-Pacific region, I don’t think there will be conflict in the global arena. In other areas, there are still opportunities for the two militaries to work together, such as counterterrorism and counter piracy, and to undertake other joint actions to provide public goods to other countries.

What do you think some of the biggest misperceptions about the People’s Liberation Army are among Americans?

The biggest misperception is about whether the People’s Liberation Army is an aggressive military or a defensive one. People have a hard time understanding why a military tasked with winning a war is inherently defensive. It seems that if you have the task to win the war, then you have to be aggressive or you have to have a strong desire to start a war. But for the PLA, being defensive isn’t just a public slogan, it’s a strategy that is based on the lessons we’ve learned from history. The PLA is a big army, but the mission it has taken on is enormous, so being defensive is the best way to ensure it can be successful. We have 14 countries that border China. We’ve solved most of the border issues, but we still have borders to defend. [This past summer, for instance, China and India clashed over their contested border in the Himalayas.] Nowadays, with China having more business overseas and people overseas, there is a strong call from the domestic population for the PLA to defend and protect the interests of people and business abroad.

What really makes me worried is the people using ideology as their main argument. They argued that as long as China is a Communist Party-ruled country, it can never be a counterpart [of the United States]… There is no space for negotiation there; all the other areas can be discussed, but the political regime is something that is not up for debate.

We’ve learned from history that if there is not a concrete goal of winning the war, then even if the war can be won, you still will lose from the national perspective. The major lesson is learned from what we’re seeing with the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Even if the military is very successful on the battlefield, if there’s not a clear national objective, all the military triumphs mean nothing, or they can only just drag a country into a difficult situation. And that’s not what China wants.

China today really hopes for there to continue to be a peaceful environment so we can continue to develop our economy, and we can continue to be a part of international society. Starting a war would destroy those goals. We won’t have a peaceful environment to develop in, we won’t be accepted by international society, and that would go totally against the so-called Chinese dream. That would be against China’s interest. The PLA is very clear about the basic rule that the military is obedient to the government, and the goal of war has to be consistent with the goal of the nation. So, for the PLA, it’s clear that being defensive is in our interest. I think that is the area of the biggest misperception.

You mentioned U.S.-China cooperation in risk management. How does that actually work?

The basic element of crisis management is establishing channels of communication. There are hotlines between the defense departments, and there are two MOUs, one on notification of major activities and the other is on the code of conduct in air and sea encounters. But aside from those, I think there are not enough to avoid all the risks.

The militaries should establish effective hotlines and make sure they work 24/7 — something that can really work during a crisis. To avoid crises, the militaries should also resume dialogues. Most of the dialogues between the two militaries are not being held as planned or as routine as before, so resuming dialogues will help the militaries exchange ideas and information and clarify bottom lines. It is also important to make sure there are spaces for track-two dialogues, to make sure there can be in-depth discussions for think tanks to talk about what the principles of crisis management could be, what the scenarios could be, and how to find out what are the riskiest factors and possible solutions in managing a crisis and to prevent escalation. Those are three areas we can improve.

Recently, the question of technological supremacy has been at the center of tensions between China and the United States. Why do you think that’s become such a focus of the relationship?

The tensions between China and the U.S. are inevitable; they’re not because of the Trump administration. Most Chinese people think that no matter if there’s a Trump administration or a Biden administration, the relationship between the two countries cannot go back to the 1980s or the 1990s. The main reason is the gap in comparative strength is shrinking. Today, what is the key factor that will decide the future development of national strength? It’s technology. Technology is seen as critical to the competition between the two countries.

Also, there are misperceptions on both sides about each other’s intentions. The U.S. has concluded that the policy of engagement has failed to make China change in the way it would like. And China’s conclusion, based on the U.S. perception, is that China will never be welcomed as part of the international system if it continues to keep its different political system. Those two conclusions are reflected in technology, especially in information and communications technologies, because they’re relevant to personal data, to national security, to ideology. For these reasons, technology becomes a flashpoint for all the different opinions.

The U.S. concluded that engagement has failed, and China is concerned about whether it can continue to be a part of the international society. To me, they’re both wrong. But these views have been accepted, or at least partially accepted, by the elites. And all these misperceptions are reflected in technology.

There are still some common interests when it comes to technology. In cybersecurity, for example, we can see common ground for the two countries to cooperate on. There are several issues that we both think are very important, but the priorities are very different. We both think information is quite important, but for the U.S., what is most important is the safety of personal data. For China, the most important thing is ideology, how to make sure that flow of information won’t endanger the stability of society. Also, for example, we both think critical infrastructure is very important, but to the U.S., it’s most important to defend it against cyber-attacks, while for China, it’s most important to achieve self-reliance. Even though both sides agree that these are important areas, we still can’t find real common ground for the two countries to set up rules.

Would a Biden presidency change the relationship?

The basic consensus in China is that no matter who is president, the tone of competitive bilateral relations will continue. But the way in which way we compete could be quite different. Most people think as a Democrat and as former vice president in the Obama administration, Biden might be more inclined to multilateral efforts, to make more efforts on rule making, to enhance relationships with allies and partners. Those are the ways Biden would compete with China. Trade and business might come back to a better track. Irrational decisions and unexpected changes would be fewer than under the current administration.

I feel very frustrated these days watching the actions and statements made by the current U.S. administration. Many measures are not rational enough, or at least, there are lots of other options to address the concerns that have been raised by the administration. The measures they have taken, to me, are really not the best approach. A lot of theoretical analysis is not enough to predict the next steps that might be taken. In the Trump administration, China has no idea what the negotiation is. The first day the negotiation can be achieved but the next day it is off again. That kind of volatility could be somewhat avoided by a Biden administration. Biden’s policy could be harsher, even harder for China to take, but it would be more predictable, so it would make China more willing to have discussions and negotiations.

The United States is very anxious that China is quickly catching up in high tech. What’s the reality?

The two countries have different assessments of each other’s capabilities. The gap in capabilities has lessened, but the conclusions are different. The U.S. thinks China will catch up very soon, and if the U.S. doesn’t take the opportunity to suppress China before it fully rises, it won’t have the chance to do it again. But in China, we still think we’re lagging behind, especially in high-tech areas. We think we’re lagging behind for many reasons. Even though we have a very high scientific expenditure, the percentage of scientific expenditure in our GDP is still much lower than that of the U.S. and of Japan, especially in basic research, which is the backbone of high technologies. There are so many areas in information and communication technologies where we are highly reliant on foreign products, like chips. We are almost 100 percent reliant on foreign supplies. Our operating systems and other core software and some hardware are mostly dependent on the supply of foreign companies. That makes China feel we are still inferior, but I guess this is not the conclusion that is being made by the United States.

So, the very different perceptions of China’s capabilities are leaving both sides with different assumptions about the activities of the other.

There are several areas in high technology where, to be frank, China will catch up very soon. But in most areas, China is still lagging behind. For example, China is doing great at 5G and artificial intelligence, e-commerce and social media, but there are so many areas where China isn’t catching up.

In recent years, the U.S. has made it a lot harder for Chinese students to study science in the U.S. Many people think this will hurt the U.S. in the long run. Will this shift help China?

In the short run, it hurts China, but in the long run, if the policy continues, yes, it will help China. Let me explain. Chinese students choose to go to the U.S. to study because the education environment is much better. Some of the most excellent ones choose to stay in the U.S. because they think the scientific research environment is better than in China. Even if most of these students can’t go to the U.S. to study and work, the current environment in China won’t improve overnight. In the short run, this could help China a bit if some scientists come back. But without a change in the overall capability of basic science research, or without the change of the scientific research culture and environment, their potential cannot be fully realized, so it won’t help China a lot. But if one or two generations of the most excellent talents stay in China, the overall capability and the whole environment will leapfrog, and that will help China.

After the Trump administration announced plans to ban TikTok and WeChat, you and Jon Bateman — who previously worked on cyber policy in the Pentagon — discussed what these moves meant. Since then, how have people in China responded?

There are a lot of different voices in the U.S. about why TikTok and WeChat should be banned. But in China, the perspectives are very different. Many people think the security risks are only an excuse, because security is an easy reason to use to force companies to cooperate with the government in implementing a technology decoupling strategy. Americans say that TikTok and WeChat have the ability to collect data that could endanger national security, but almost all social media apps are based on the collection of personal data. Collecting personal data itself can’t be the reason behind banning such an app.

People in China are trying to figure out whether this is part of a long-term strategy or if it is a temporary one to gain domestic support before the election. This could just be the Trump administration trying to show how tough it is. So, some in China think the bans could be quite temporary.

Also, unlike Huawei, TikTok has a peer competitor in the United States: Facebook. People have watched the role Facebook has played in the whole process, and it makes Chinese people think that the ban is a way to contain the rise of a competitive company from China, because the economic interests of another big company in the U.S. has to be protected.

The fourth reaction is more emotional. Some people are comparing the possible tie-up between TikTok and Oracle to the treaty that was signed in 1901 after China lost its war against the eight countries who invaded [during the Boxer Rebellion]. So, people have turned it into a nationalist issue, seeing America as using its advantage to contain a weak party. That treaty was totally unequal to the Chinese people. Now, they’re reading this deal and thinking about how hegemonic America’s government is.

Is there anything that makes you hopeful about the U.S.-China relationship?

Thank you for the question. I’ve been hoping I could be more optimistic. The bright side for me is both sides are still fully aware that we are the two big countries that can change the world. There are still a lot of issues we can cooperate on globally, such as counterterrorism, such as nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, such as climate change. There can only be achievements on all of those issues if the two countries work together. No matter how the two countries view each other or compete with each other, they still have to make efforts to make sure those global issues can be solved or can be managed. That is what still makes me hopeful.

When I first got to Washington, some people saw me just as a retired military officer and with suspicion and distrust. But when they got to know me, their impression changed. So, I think people-to-people exchange helps give people a more vivid perception of other countries and allows them to have better understandings of why some countries are making different decisions. Beating the other side is not the only reason countries make decisions that affect one another. With more engagement among people, we can have better understandings — not only from personal perspectives but from multiple dimensions.

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